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Ukraine is stuck between a rock and a hard place—the Russian onslaught continues, Europe is putting pressure on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy over an embarrassing corruption scandal in his administration, and the United States is looking to wash its hand of the conflict with its 28-point peace plan that privileges Russia.
Ukraine is hoping that Türkiye could help it navigate these choppy waters. Türkiye wants to help.
Zelenskyy met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Istanbul on Nov. 19 to discuss the peace plan and the war, which will enter its fourth year in February. Erdogan called for “all partners that wish to see the end of bloodshed in the region to have a constructive approach toward the Istanbul process."
At the beginning of the conflict in February 2022, the Turkish government hosted talks between Ukraine and Russia, which produced a draft plan that could have established a ceasefire. While the “Istanbul process” at the time contained elements that Ukraine did not like—considerably curtailing the size of its armed forces, barring its entry into NATO (and possibly the EU), and tasking Russia as a “guarantor” of Ukrainian security—the Trump administration’s 28-point plan is not much better.
Rumored to be undergoing revisions by the Europeans and the Ukrainians, the current plan envisions the conditional recognition of Russia’s territorial gains in Ukraine since 2014, including its illegal annexation of Crimea, while setting current battle lines as the line of control in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. Also included in the plan is permanently blocking Ukrainian membership in NATO, although pursuing full EU membership will be possible.
As consolation prize for Ukraine, the U.S. is hoping to convince Russia to use some its assets frozen in 2022 for Ukrainian reconstruction in exchange for lifting the sanctions on Moscow and enabling its reintegration into the global economy, which would both help and complicate Türkiye’s ties to Ukraine and Russia.
Although the war in Ukraine looks more like World War I than World War II—trench warfare across static lines instead rapid maneuver warfare—Türkiye recognizes that Moscow is slowly but surely gaining ground against Kyiv. U.S. material and monetary support have all but ceased, and whatever Ukraine obtains from the Americans it must either pay or get the Europeans to pick up the tab.
Türkiye is trying to help Ukraine secure a better deal by engaging the Russians, which the European countries can no longer do.
On Nov. 24, Erdogan had a phone call with Putin, pledging continued Turkish efforts to end the war in a “just and permanent peace by facilitating direct contact between the parties,” according to the readout from the Directorate of Communications of the Turkish Presidency.
Here, Türkiye is looking to show its diplomatic weight both to Russia and the United States, supporting Zelenskyy’s engagement with Western partners, and making sure he appears more receptive to at least some of the unpalatable terms in the 28-point plan.
Ankara is calculating that, having failed to obtain a much bigger portion of Ukraine, unable to install a puppet regime in Kyiv, and locked out of Europe even as its energy and military infrastructure is getting attacked on a near-daily basis, Russia is now more amenable to peace.
Since the beginning of the war in 2022, Türkiye has emerged as one of the main brokers of critical agreements including between Ukraine and Russia. These include prisoner swaps, the grain deal, and hosting Ukrainian and Russian diplomats that led to the April 2022 draft ceasefire agreement.
Ultimately, Ankara hopes that Kyiv, which was emerging as one of the major recipient of Turkish foreign direct investments and as a defense cooperation partnership, could get a better ceasefire deal and rebuild after the guns fall silent.
Perhaps the most dramatic idea related to the Ukraine ceasefire / peace plan comes from French President Emanuel Macron, who suggested a “reassurance force” led by Turkish, British, and French troops and supported by a total of 20 nations to provide security and training for Ukrainian forces.
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Ironic that the French president, who had dispatched his navy to the eastern Mediterranean in summer 2020 to back Greece during its standoff with Türkiye and signed a defense agreement with Athens the following year, is now counting on the Turkish Armed Force in Ukraine.
Ankara does not seem opposed to the idea, but its participation in a peacekeeping and training mission in Ukraine would depend on events in Syria.
The Trump administration is trying to convince the Kurdish-led SDF, whose lead organization, the YPG, is the Syrian branch of the PKK, which Ankara, Washington, and most European capitals consider as a terrorist organization—to integrate with the administration of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, whom Türkiye supports.
Ankara’s ability to help Kyiv militarily would depend on the PKK and SDF no longer posing a threat to Türkiye from Syria and Iraq. Whether Trump could deliver that—and make sure Israel does not throw a wrench into those plans—remains to be seen.
Less dramatic than a military presence in Ukraine would be playing to Türkiye’s strengths. Ankara could resume its role in facilitating the exchange of prisoners of war and hostages, including Crimean Tatars, an ethnic Turkic group who opposed Russia’s 2014 annexation. Similarly, the return of kidnapped Ukrainian children, reportedly some 20,000, could help Ankara build goodwill across the board.
It is likely that Türkiye will reach out to other countries that enjoys good relations with Russia—namely, China, India, Saudi Arabia, UAE—to secure their cooperation in these dossiers.
Another issue is Black Sea security, where Türkiye is strong. Ankara could use its considerable naval power to hunt for mines and ensure that deconfliction zones between the Ukrainian and Russian navies is observed, while civilian shipping is not harassed.
At the beginning of the war, Türkiye denied Russian warships access to the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits under the Montreux Convention of 1936, but it also did not turn over the advanced Ada-class corvettes that were built for the Ukrainian Navy in Turkish shipyards. Similarly, Ankara did not allow foreign-built warships from crossing the Straits to join the Ukrainian military
Trade and supporting Ukraine’s reconstruction once the conflict ends is another area where Türkiye enjoys unique advantages. Ultimately, Turkish officials and business circles, which have been active in conflict and post-conflict areas such as Iraq, Somalia, and Syria in recent decades and did not abandon Ukraine, expect to play a preeminent role following the war.
Beside increased investments from Türkiye, joint partnerships with the U.S, European, Japanese, and Korea companies is quite likely, and Western-financed tenders will be an area where Turkish firms could help Ukraine.
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Of course, there are various challenges to Türkiye helping Ukraine.
For example, Ukrainians would like to see Türkiye curtail its oil and gas trade with Russia, its other Black Sea neighbor and third largest trading after the EU and China. Ankara has been signing new energy deals with its closest regional ally and fellow Turkic republic, Azerbaijan, as well as its strategic partner Qatar to lessen its imports from Russia.
Erdogan and Trump also oversaw new agreements during the former’s visit to the White House on Sept. 25 where the Turkish side pledged to buy LNG from the United States.
Here, Ankara is trying to square several circles. Russian energy is readily available, much more reliable, and cost effective because of international sanctions, even though the Turkish officials begrudgingly admit that such commerce helps Moscow to fund its war against Ukraine. Of course, they also point out that Greece helps Russia to continue importing oil with a “shadow fleet” despite EU sanctions. Meanwhile, many Turkish firms have become useful middlemen in Russia’s international trade, occasionally helping Moscow to bust Western sanctions.
But on other matters most sensitive to Ukraine, such as recognizing Russia’s territorial gains and illegal annexation of Crimea, Ankara continues stand by Kyiv. Despite policy and opinion divergences among Turkish policymakers, owing to the memory of the Ottoman Empire’s loss of territory from Imperial Russia in the 18th and 19th centuries, not willing acceded to Russian expansionism is virtually encoded in Türkiye’s geopolitical and diplomatic DNA.
Irrespective of the final wording on the ceasefire / peace plan and its complicated ties with both the West and Russia, Türkiye will stand by and support Ukraine.
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