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Reducing the discussion to the so-called "Turkish–Israeli conflict" on Arab lands oversimplifies a reality that is more complex than it may appear. Especially when considering the "fundamental difference" between Türkiye and Israel in terms of their reach, history, and deep ties in the region with the neighbors.
The scene appears highly complex, given the reality of a "geo-security competition" along the "edges" of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, and of an "ongoing redrawing" of maps of energy and routes such as Eastern Mediterranean gas, South Caucasus and Suez Canal–Red Sea.
This competition comes amid the collision of networks of influence— between an American–European axis that includes Israel, and a Russian–Iranian axis with arms in Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq—while Türkiye stands apart with its role as a "pivotal player" maneuvering between the two axes.
Given the demise of Iran and Iran-tied militias in the region, a new question arises: Will Israel and Türkiye divide influence in the region?
The question is complex, and it deserves a deeper look into history, energy and geopolitics.
Historically, the Turkish–Israeli partnership reached its peak in the 1990s, marked by military cooperation agreements in 1996, joint training, and defense industry collaboration, before deteriorating following the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010.
Later, the partnership experienced intermittent waves of convergence, culminating in its collapse after the Gaza War of 2023–2025. That war was followed by Ankara’s announcement in November 2024 of cutting relations and gradually suspending trade.
Geographically, there is more than one area of direct contact between Türkiye and Israel, based on the reality outlined above, namely:
Syria and Lebanon
While Israel continues its hostile actions that have targeted Lebanon since late 2024, and recently Syria as well, Türkiye observes these incidents through two lenses: the security of its border in northern Syria, and the balance of power with Iran and Israel.
Iraq
Ankara has entrenched a military presence in northern Iraq against the PKK terrorist group, and coordinates economically through the "Development Road" project stretching from Al-Faw Port in Basra to Mersin, Türkiye. This is a strategic project expected to reshape the flow of goods from the Gulf to Europe.
Yemen and the Red Sea
This region weighs heavily on both energy and goods supply chains, after Houthi attacks on shipping disrupted the Suez–Bab al-Mandeb route and raised global transport costs.
This pushed Washington to respond with broad strikes, joined by Israel, which recently carried out targeted strikes in Sanaa against Houthi leaders. At the same time, Houthis continued launching missiles and drones at vessels linked to Israel.
Here, the importance of energy corridors emerges in understanding the background of the conflict and its political shifts, most notably:
Eastern Mediterranean
The EastMed pipeline (Israel–Cyprus–Greece–Italy) has remained a suspended project, losing U.S. support, and the Gaza War has further complicated its feasibility. In contrast, the option of channeling Israeli gas to Egypt for liquefaction or consumption has reemerged strongly via the "Leviathan–Egypt" deal (130 bcm until 2040), signed in August 2025. This reduces the appeal of any direct land–sea route through Türkiye in the near term, despite the "buzz" raised by Israeli leaks about Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s directive not to proceed with extending the "gas deal" with Egypt without review — countered by joint confirmations that "the deal is on track," and Netanyahu’s move is "merely a maneuver."
Türkiye as a Euro-Asian corridor
Ankara remains the "bottleneck" for Azerbaijani and sometimes Russian gas toward Europe: TANAP → TAP with an expandable capacity up to ~31/20 bcm annually, and TurkStream, which continues carrying Russian gas to the Balkans and Central Europe despite efforts to reduce dependence. This gives Türkiye significant bargaining weight with both Washington and Moscow.
Shipping and trade alternatives
The disruption of the Red Sea corridor due to the Gaza War revived the relevance of alternative land–sea routes such as IMEC (India–Middle East–Europe). This reliance is reinforced by Ankara and Baghdad’s promotion of Iraq’s "Development Road" project as a fast alternative between the Gulf and Europe, grounded in the need to stabilize Syria and Iraq.
The United States supports Israel militarily and politically, leads maritime security in the Red Sea through a multinational operation, works on trade-link projects like India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) to reduce supply-chain vulnerability, seeks to curb Iran’s expansion in Iraq and Syria, and tries to manage escalation with Türkiye over the Kurdish "SDF" issue.
As for Russia, it has entrenched its military presence in Syria since 2015, maintains "deconfliction channels" with Israel, and criticizes Israeli strikes for diplomatic necessity.
Economically, however, it relies more and more on TurkStream due to the fallout of the war with Ukraine and the impossibility of channeling gas through it, giving Ankara a "rare pressure card" over Moscow.
One pressing question remains in this intertwined and highly complex reality: will Türkiye and Israel divide influence in the region after Iran’s defeat?
A substantial view dismisses this, arguing that any answer must consider five structural reasons:
Thus, the "division of influence" scenario appears unlikely given these factors.
But what about the scenarios for the next three to five years?
Continued intermittent clashes between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, alongside Israeli strikes in Syria, Turkish containment in northern Syria and Iraq against the PKK, and managed Red Sea navigation crises through temporary arrangements.
This scenario favors expanded Israeli gas exports to Egypt rather than reviving a pipeline with Türkiye.
The progress of the "Development Road" and a possible revival of IMEC if the Gaza–Lebanon front calms may reposition supply chains partly away from Bab al-Mandeb–Suez, with Türkiye benefiting as a transit hub, and Israel gaining through connecting its Eastern Mediterranean ports as relay stations.
A potential war expansion in Lebanon would push Europe to demand quick alternative gas sources—LNG/Egypt/Azerbaijan via Türkiye—which would obstruct any new EastMed marine gas path.
This would extend Africa-circumventing routes, raise shipping costs, and push toward broader reliance on land–rail corridors (Saudi Arabia–Jordan–Israel/Egypt, if feasible) and on Türkiye as a land–pipeline bridge to Europe.
It means that Syria and Lebanon will remain arenas of proxy competition: Israel versus the Iranian axis, with Türkiye exercising "practical neutrality" toward the south while focusing on the north.
Thus, any settlement in Lebanon will be influenced by the balance of fire in the south and by corridor guarantees, keeping in mind that the documented destruction in southern Lebanon warns of huge reconstruction costs and the need for border-security arrangements, which the United States seeks through its envoy Tom Perriello to Lebanon and Syria.
In Iraq, it points toward likely trilateral economic–security deals (Baghdad–Ankara–Gulf) around the Development Road and energy flows.
In Yemen, it suggests the bottleneck pressure on global trade in the Red Sea will persist, even if fire intensity diminishes, with the potential to ignite at every political turn in Gaza or Lebanon.
A careful reading of this reality, its scenarios, and its reflection on Arab presence in the region highlights the need for Arab decision-makers to consider the following:
The scenario of Türkiye and Israel dividing influence in the region appears unlikely.
The more realistic scenario is one of multiple competing poles marked by temporary deals and rival corridors, where energy flows to where trust and security exist at the lowest cost — and this, in turn, will determine alliances, not the other way around.
In other words, the region is heading into an era of "networks of influence," not "binary divisions." Any effective Arab strategy must remain flexible, making economic security a priority, and turning energy from a source of conflict into a tool of temporary rapprochement and mutual interest.
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