Newsletters
The establishment of the Afghanistan contact group by the special representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan at the meeting held in Tashkent on Aug. 26 marks the beginning of a new era in Central Asian diplomacy.
The current development is in line with the Roadmap 2025-27 approved at the Sixth Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Heads of State held in Astana in 2024 and demonstrates the will of regional actors to take an institutionalized and collective position on Afghanistan for the first time. This format, led by Uzbekistan, is critical not only for the future of Afghanistan but also for the economic integration, security and international positioning of Central Asia.
For many years, the Central Asian countries have acted individually and cautiously on the Afghanistan issue, mostly prioritising their own national interests and avoiding developing a common framework. However, the Taliban's return to power in 2021 reshaped the region's fragile security balances. In particular, Russia’s official recognition of Taliban rule in July 2025 marked a new turning point for the Central Asian states.
While Moscow’s move necessitated a more active approach in relations with Kabul, it also led the countries of the region to take more coordinated steps to protect their own interests. In this context, the meeting held in Tashkent on Aug. 26 and the establishment of the contact group on Afghanistan are of historical significance as it is the first institutional mechanism that emerged entirely by the joint decision of the states of the region, outside the initiative of external actors.
The strategic importance of the contact group is primarily evident in the security dimension. The unstable nature of Afghanistan poses threats to Central Asia not only on its southern borders but also on a regional scale. The growing activity of Daesh-Khorasan (Daesh-K), cross-border activities of radical organizations, drug trafficking and organized crime networks are common security challenges that directly affect the entire region. Drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Central Asia not only undermines border security but also threatens the social fabric and economic stability. Similarly, the possibility of infiltration of terrorist organizations into Central Asian territory brings the necessity for countries to find a common ground in their national security strategies. The contact group, therefore, aims to strengthen regional solidarity by regularizing and institutionalizing security consultations, recognizing that these threats are too great for any country to tackle alone.
Another critical aspect of this initiative is that, for the first time, Central Asia has created a platform independent of external actors on the Afghanistan issue. In previous processes, initiatives on Afghanistan were mostly shaped within the framework of the priorities of great powers such as the U.S., Russia or China, and Central Asian countries were often pushed into a position of compliance rather than decision-making. However, the contact group established in Tashkent is a unique diplomatic mechanism through which the countries of the region set their own security agenda and put their own interests at the centre.
Moreover, in the long run, the contact group is expected to contribute to a stronger and more unified representation of the Central Asian countries on international platforms. The articulation of a common position on Afghanistan in formats such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the United Nations or the C5+1 will both increase the region's foreign policy effectiveness and give Central Asia a more advantageous diplomatic ground in negotiations with major powers. Therefore, the contact group should not only be seen as a consultative platform, but also as a strategic tool to reshape the security architecture of the region. If supported by regular meetings, joint action plans and coordinated security policies, this platform is likely to increase Central Asia’s resilience to security threats and make it a more visible and effective actor in global diplomacy.
Establishing stable relations with Afghanistan forms the backbone of Central Asia’s global integration strategy. Due to its geographical location, Afghanistan is a natural gateway connecting Central Asia to South Asia and the Indian Ocean, and therefore occupies a central position in the economic and geopolitical calculations of the regional states. In particular, access to Pakistani ports means a critical gain in terms of access to global trade networks and strategic autonomy. The fact that Central Asian countries do not have direct access to the seas makes their economic growth dependent on external corridors, which both increases costs and limits regional mobility. Transit routes through Afghanistan will break this dependence and allow the region to integrate into international trade networks in a more flexible and versatile way.
In this context, projects involving Afghanistan are directly linked to regional and global strategies. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Türkiye-led Central Corridor and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), shaped by the India-Iran-Russia triangle, make Afghanistan’s transit role even more valuable for Central Asia. The common point of these projects is to secure Eurasia's east-west and north-south trade flows and make the region an indispensable part of the global logistics system. Therefore, stabilizing Afghanistan is a strategic imperative not only for Central Asia but also for the wider Eurasian trade architecture.
Economic data clearly demonstrate the concrete reflections of this approach. The trade volume between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan reached $866 million in 2023, and only a year later, in 2024, 35 agreements worth $2.5 billion were signed between the parties. A significant number of these agreements focus on energy, transport and infrastructure projects and aim to establish new connection lines through Afghanistan. Uzbekistan’s outreach to Kabul is an indication that the country sees Afghanistan not only as a security risk but also as an economic partner. Similarly, Kazakhstan remains Afghanistan’s main wheat and flour supplier, with trade between the two countries reaching $700 million in the first nine months of 2024. They aimed to increase this volume to $3 billion in the next five years. The current picture proves that regional actors consider Afghanistan as a strategic connection in their economic integration plans.
The contact group provides an institutional framework for securing these economic initiatives on political and diplomatic grounds. Joint meetings function to coordinate trade, energy and transport projects as well as security consultations. This collective approach to Afghanistan institutionalizes the region's efforts to hold on to the southern corridors and strengthens the hand of Central Asian countries in negotiations with external actors. Therefore, the contact group is not only a political coordination tool, but also an accelerator of regional economic integration and a basis for the pursuit of geopolitical autonomy. If this mechanism can be operated sustainably and security risks on the ground can be managed, Central Asia’s role in global trade networks will deepen and Afghanistan will move from being a problem area to a strategic partner at the centre of regional cooperation.
About the author: Zeynep Guzem Ozpinar is a board member and foreign policy specialist at the Turkish Foreign Policy Research Center (TUDPAM).
4 min read
