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The Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 ended the war but entrenched Bosnia and Herzegovina’s division into two entities. It established a weak central state, entrenched veto powers, and left ultimate authority in the hands of the international High Representative—who holds the so-called “Bonn Powers.”
While this framework secured peace, it institutionalized dysfunction and created a system where governance remains fragile and paralyzed nearly three decades later.
Bosnia's 1992–1995 war left nearly 100,000 people dead and divided the country into two largely autonomous entities: the Serb-majority Republika Srpska (RS) and the Bosniak-Croat Federation. Both are held together by a weak central government and overseen by an internationally backed envoy, who has the power to impose and annul laws.
The postwar arrangement has steadily lost functionality. In 2025, defiance of court rulings and outright rejection of the High Representative’s authority pushed the system to a breaking point.
Republika Srpska’s leader, Milorad Dodik, has been the key figure fueling this escalation. The current crisis began earlier this year when Bosnia's courts found him guilty of failing to comply with the orders of the current envoy, Christian Schmidt.
In early August, Dodik was stripped of office and banned from politics for six years for flouting the envoy’s decisions. This marked the first time an entity president was toppled using the domestic rule of law.
"These elections are meaningless and will not take place in the RS," Dodik told reporters in Banja Luka, the capital of the Serb entity, after the announcement. "I'm not threatening violence, but I believe people will take to the streets and demonstrate," he said.
He avoided a one-year prison sentence by paying a €19,000 ($22,000) fine, but an appeals court upheld the ruling that he be removed from the RS presidency and banned from political office for six years.
Dodik has vowed to block elections in Republika Srpska and to hold a series of referendums—the first of which would address the court ruling itself. Later in August, the RS regional assembly voted to hold a referendum on Oct. 25, posing a fresh challenge to Bosnia’s already weak central government.
At the same time, the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CEC) scheduled an early presidential election in Republika Srpska for Nov. 23, 2025, setting up a direct clash of legitimacy.
On Sept. 3, Dodik went further: despite his ban, he oversaw a government reshuffle in Banja Luka. The parliament replaced Prime Minister Radovan Viskovic with Savo Minic, who tied his platform directly to defending Republika Srpska’s autonomy and Dodik’s political stance.
Erdem Eren, director of the Rumeli Studies Application and Research Center (RUCAM) at Istanbul Rumeli University, said Dodik’s rhetoric is perceived as populist actions aimed at gaining the support of Serbs in Bosnia.
“Of course, there is some truth to this, but there is a greater reality, which is the Serbs’ ideal of establishing a Greater Serbia. Belgrade never abandoned the idea of establishing a ‘Greater Serbia’ after the breakup of Yugoslavia. Dodik is acting as if he were the Bosnian branch of this ideal,” he told Türkiye Today in an exclusive interview.
Meanwhile, Mustafa Krupalija, assistant professor at the Political Science and International Relations Department of the International University of Sarajevo, said, "The referendum card, frequently used by Dodik in his 'crisis politics,' has become an indispensable element of Bosnian politics in recent years. However, such initiatives do not have direct legal enforcement power in the field."
Krupalija noted that the referendum in question is less a well-planned political strategy and more a temporary and hasty maneuver developed by Dodik to overcome the political impasse he finds himself in.
Dodik's decision to hold a referendum is not unprecedented, but past examples have shown that such votes carry no practical weight, as they lack a solid legal basis.
Two scenarios are emerging here. The first is that Dodik continues with his current strategy and sinks deeper into the quagmire. The other is that he emerges victorious from the clash for legitimacy.
Jahja Muhasilovic, assistant professor at the same department in Sarajevo, argued that the second option—the failure of Bosnia's state institutions to assert their authority—would have dire consequences for Bosnia and Herzegovina and would ultimately allow Dodik to claim victory.
"If the security forces do not enforce the decisions of the judicial institutions, we will face such a scenario. This would lead to a de facto division of Bosnia and Herzegovina," Muhasilovic told Türkiye Today.
He stressed that this would not mean independence, adding, "Of course, this division would not entail secession from the state; it would simply show that there is a parallel Serbian state within Bosnia and Herzegovina."
Bosnia now faces several scenarios. Competing claims of legitimacy could paralyze state institutions and push Republika Srpska into open confrontation with Sarajevo.
International sanctions may raise the cost of Dodik’s defiance but could also harden his base. Stronger intervention by the High Representative remains possible, though it risks fueling secessionist backlash.
The least destabilizing outcome would see the referendum remain symbolic, early elections proceed, and outside mediators broker a compromise that restores constitutional order.
Noting that Dodik's political career in Bosnia and Herzegovina appears to be nearing its end, Krupalija said, “After declaring some of the state's key institutions ineffective at the entity level, his call for Serbian officials to ‘withdraw from the institutions’ went unheeded, which was actually a serious blow to Dodik.”
The fact that Dodik soon appeared as a witness before institutions he had declared invalid and that he used the same court to convert his prison sentence into a fine discredited him in the eyes of the public and raised questions about his accountability.
Therefore, the referendum is essentially a political show aimed at his own voter base, Krupalija added.
“It seems that the only way he can retain his power, at least partially, is to maintain his influential position within his party. However, when he loses this power, he will undoubtedly take his place on the dusty shelves of history.”
Even if the decision is implemented, Muhasilovic stated that Dodik could continue as the leader of his political party, adding: “This would not be a good scenario for Bosnia and Herzegovina, because then he (Dodik) would not lose his power; he would place his own people in certain state institutions, which he is actively doing right now.”
Muhasilovic also pointed out that, in the long term, if Dodik prevails in this crisis, it could lead to the “internal” division of the state. However, he emphasized that this division would not mean independence or secession for the RS.
Eren also said it would not be surprising if Dodik further deepened the crisis, given that social integration in Bosnia is unlikely to improve in the short or medium term and the political and legal structure cannot be redesigned.
“To put it bluntly, the way to ensure peace in Bosnia is for the international actors who established the Dayton Peace Agreement to come together and refocus their attention on Bosnia. However, neither the U.S. nor the EU has such an item on its agenda."
"Just as the deepest point of darkness is the starting point for light, perhaps the beginning of peace in Bosnia will also be when this crisis reaches its deepest point,” he added.
Dayton ended the war but locked Bosnia into a cycle of crisis management. With these recent developments, Dodik’s defiance has become its sharpest stress test yet.
With a referendum in October, early elections in November, and parallel institutions already in motion, Bosnia stands at a dangerous crossroads.
The crisis is not only structural but also geopolitical, for potential turmoil in Bosnia could ignite a conflagration that threatens the entire fragile balance of the Balkans.
Unless political actors enforce a workable compromise, “keeping Dodik in power” could push Bosnia’s fragile order into a new and more perilous phase.
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