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For decades, Gulf monarchies relied almost exclusively on the United States to guarantee their security. From deterring Iran to defending energy infrastructure, Washington’s military presence was the bedrock of the regional order. But over the past 15 years, the credibility of that umbrella has eroded. The Arab uprisings in 2011, the drawn-out war in Yemen, the 2017 blockade of Qatar, and Iran’s 2019 attacks on Saudi oil facilities exposed the fragility of Gulf states’ reliance on external protection.
It is no surprise that all states in the region are searching for more trustworthy partners. As U.S. reliability falters, Riyadh has moved to lock in a fallback: late on Wednesday, Saudi Arabia and nuclear-armed Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact, a move that not only revives a decades-old partnership but also signals a hedging strategy in the wake of Israel’s strikes on Qatar that upended the diplomatic calculus across the Gulf.
This shifting security map underscores a broader reality: neither American troops nor billion-dollar arms purchases have shielded Gulf monarchies from emerging threats. Washington’s gradual pivot to Asia has only deepened the perception of abandonment. Much of the debate has centered on China, India, and Russia. Yet another regional actor has quietly carved out a more direct and tangible role in Gulf security than any of these global powers: Türkiye.
Crucially, Türkiye is not a newcomer to Gulf security. Its presence is built on tested foundations and already operational mechanisms. From its military base in Qatar to joint exercises and defense industry cooperation, Ankara has demonstrated not only political will but also an ability to deploy and sustain capabilities in the Gulf. Unlike speculative partnerships with distant powers, Türkiye’s role is not aspirational—it is already being practiced on the ground.
Doubts about U.S. reliability deepened after Israel’s strikes on Gaza and even Qatar, a state long tied to Washington. Confusion over whether Trump had tacitly approved the moves further undermined faith in American commitments.
It's not from day to another. During the Biden administration time, frustrated by the lack of a formal U.S. security guarantee, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman warned in a 2023 interview that Riyadh could shift “their armament from America to another place”—adding, “You don’t want that to be shifted.”
President Trump’s return briefly revived Saudi hopes, but no trust-giving development followed. Instead, within months, the Gulf saw two firsts under his watch: a direct Iranian strike in support of Israel on a Gulf state and a direct Israeli strike on one.
Even Qatar’s Al Udeid Air Base—the largest U.S. installation in the Middle East—failed to deter either. Once seen as an ironclad shield, it was directly targeted by Iran in June and bypassed by Israel weeks later. For Gulf leaders, the conclusion was clear: the American umbrella no longer guarantees protection, and the imminent and biggest threat is not Iran anymore.
Türkiye’s entry into the Gulf security equation is not entirely new. Since the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to power in 2002, Ankara has pursued a more assertive foreign policy, shifting after 2011 from soft-power tools—trade, culture, diplomacy—to hard-security engagement. Rising instability in the Middle East, coupled with U.S. retrenchment, pushed Türkiye to expand its defense footprint abroad.
The turning point came with the 2017 Gulf crisis, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt imposed a blockade on Qatar. While Washington was divided—then-President Donald Trump even appeared to support the blockade—Türkiye acted swiftly. Ankara sent troops to Doha, expanded its newly established military base, and became the first external power to offer hard-security guarantees to Qatar. That move not only deterred potential escalation but also marked Türkiye’s return as a security actor in the Gulf for the first time since the Ottoman era.
Türkiye’s growing defense role in the Gulf coincides with the rise of its indigenous arms industry. Drones, armored vehicles, missile systems, and naval platforms have turned Ankara into one of the region’s fastest-growing defense exporters. Between 2012 and 2016, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were among the top clients for Turkish defense products, accounting for around 20% of exports each.
The relationships shifted during the blockade, when Qatar became Ankara’s primary defense partner. But Turkish defense sales have also expanded to Oman, Kuwait, and others. By 2021, Oman alone represented 16% of Türkiye’s arms exports, while Qatar accounted for 14%. These figures suggest that Gulf militaries see Turkish systems not only as cost-effective but also politically reliable.
Unlike the U.S. or Europe, Ankara has been willing to share technology and customize systems to partner needs, an approach that appeals to Gulf buyers seeking autonomy from Washington’s restrictive conditions.
Not all Gulf states view Türkiye’s role equally. Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman have been the most open to deeper defense ties, seeing Ankara as both a partner and a counterweight to regional rivals. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, by contrast, have oscillated between competition and cooperation. The 2021 Al-Ula agreement, which ended the blockade of Qatar, also allowed Ankara to mend ties with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, paving the way for a cautious reopening of security and defense discussions.
Despite these differences, strategic imperatives often outweigh political rifts. Gulf states recognize that Türkiye brings geographic proximity, a proven willingness to deploy troops, and a track record of deterrence at a moment when Washington appears distracted and uninterested.
Kuwait and Oman have signed multiple military agreements with Türkiye this year alone, in January and February.
Türkiye’s closest regional allies, Syria and Qatar, initially aligned with Ankara largely out of concern over Iran’s influence, though for Doha it was also about hedging against rivals inside the Gulf.
Today, that calculus has shifted. In Damascus, the perceived threat no longer comes primarily from Tehran-supported actors but from Israel. Ankara has seized on this change in Syria, positioning itself as a provider of security guarantees, but the moment came now that there are potential areas for Lebanon, Jordan, and the wider Gulf.
Meanwhile, skeptics may ask what Türkiye can offer that Pakistan, with its nuclear arsenal, cannot. The answer lies in manpower and the ability to project forces. Türkiye has a proven record of deploying and sustaining troops abroad—its bases in Qatar, Libya and elsewhere being one example. On the other hand, critics may ask why Ankara did not stop the recent Israeli strike in Qatar. The reality is that Türkiye’s presence in Doha centered on land forces, not missile defense, and reports suggest Ankara did in fact provide intelligence ahead of the attack that helped mitigate its impact.
Furthermore, Türkiye is not hesitant to enter the region alongside other global powers or partners such as Pakistan. For instance, the military assets of Türkiye and Pakistan could be complementary.
Ankara is leveraging its security capabilities not to exploit the regional balance of power but to advance a policy of cooperation and mutual interests.
The real test, however, for Ankara will be whether it can scale up this role without stretching its resources thin.
The weakening of Washington’s security umbrella has not left a vacuum but rather a crowded marketplace of suitors.
It's crucial to understand that this window of opportunity should not be read as either an overstatement of Türkiye’s power or a dismissal of its limits. Ankara itself needs reliable agreements to sustain its security with actors like Pakistan as well.
The matter is that the low-population Gulf monarchies with their welfare society projects can leverage Türkiye’s distinct military assets in exchange for the resources they are willing to share to safeguard that condition.
13 min read
