Newsletters
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was considered the main opposition group in Syria at the time of the Asaad regime. With the criminalization of the Brotherhood in 1980 and the Hama insurgency in 1982, their active political force was effectively broken in Syria, as most of the leaders were either imprisoned or exiled. Without a homeland to operate in, they started spreading around Europe. Especially after 2011, while using satellite channels and resistance committees to keep their cause alive, Türkiye emerged as a key hub for its survival. By hosting them, it offered refuge to their ideas and influence on Syria’s fragmented politics.
However, the recent call in Syria to dissolve the Brotherhood turns the exiles in Türkiye into political liabilities, rather than foreign supporters of a dormant but still existent regime. This decision conveys a clear message: for Ankara and Damascus to further develop their close ties, Türkiye may need to reconsider the role of Brotherhood-linked networks and exiles on its soil within the broader framework of reconciliation. It also aligns with Syria’s future vision and regional trends in the Middle East, which brand the Brotherhood as a threat to traditional state authority and sovereignty. As Syria attempts to redefine its global status and establish post-war political legitimacy, the Brotherhood becomes a bargaining chip over the choice between pragmatism and ideology.
The MB flourished in Türkiye through media organizations, identity projection, and a political diaspora. It was a strategic location that provided them with shelter and citizenship, protecting them from the threat of extradition. Over time, the Brotherhood sought to present itself as a legitimate alternative to the Assad regime by adopting Ankara’s democratic-Islamic discourse.
Amid recent calls from circles close to the Syrian government for its dissolution, however, the movement risks fading into political relics sustained largely by Ankara’s tolerance. While in the past its exiled members have been able to mobilize through media outlets, diaspora networks, and occasional involvement in opposition platforms, today they function less as independent actors and more in a collaborative capacity under Türkiye’s auspices—subject to being accommodated or curtailed in line with Ankara’s strategic interests. Their divorce from Syria further deepens this one-way dependence, leaving them less as independent political actors and more as participants shaped by Ankara’s broader strategic posture. It is also important to note that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) originally drew inspiration from the Brotherhood's organizational strategies and capacity to blend Islamic identity with political activism, even as it developed a uniquely Turkish model. This similarity explains why, despite their declining direct impact on regional politics, Brotherhood exiles found resonance in Türkiye.
In the absence of a homeland anchoring their ideologies, and split between Istanbul and London branches in the post-Arab uprisings period, factionalism is expected, such as generational divides, disputes over finances, and competing claims to relevance. As seen in Egypt and Jordan, internal splits erode their coherence as a group, and the same applies to Türkiye.
Moreover, as Türkiye faces inflationary pressures and domestic political unrest that strains the governing alliance, it becomes increasingly challenging to justify hosting Brotherhood exiles, who command only limited domestic support. For many, their presence has come to represent the burdens of past ideological choices, adding to public discontent.
Evidently, the remaining members will either split into smaller, more radicalized branches in an attempt to stay relevant, or they will either cease to exist as a political community and disappear into moderate religious or social circles. This highlights a broader reality: dissolution inside Syria not only diminishes the Brotherhood’s exiles abroad, but also compels them to navigate a precarious future where maintaining relevance will require adaptation, lest they risk gradual fragmentation or fading into obscurity.
During Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s tenure as prime minister, Türkiye became a destination for several prominent MB members, such as Omar Mushaweh, Amr Darrag, Mahmoud Ezzat, and Talaat Fahmi. The movement was regarded in Ankara primarily as an ideological organization rather than a terrorist group, a view reinforced by the absence of evidence linking its members in Türkiye to harmful activities. Nonetheless, this approach generated tensions with regional partners such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and others, who viewed the Brotherhood through a more critical lens. Since 1980, Syria has designated the MB as a terrorist organization, prompting Damascus to view their presence abroad not as a humanitarian gesture but as sheltering adversaries of the state—an enduring obstacle to post-Assad political reconciliation, particularly over whether Syria’s future governance should follow a secular or religious model.
The idea to dissolve the Brotherhood in Syria changes the trajectory of the developing alliance between Syria and Türkiye. For Türkiye, which provided refuge for exiles and once viewed them as part of the Syrian National Council, this development dispels any remaining notion that these figures still constitute a meaningful opposition force, leaving Turkish officials with less scope to frame Syria policy through an identity-driven diplomatic lens.
Instead, domestic pressures, such as demand for the return of Syrian refugees, now dominate Türkiye’s priorities. The dissolution also enables Syria to ask Türkiye to distance itself from the Brotherhood to accelerate further progress in their developing close relationship, while opening the door for talks to shift from an ideological basis toward a more pragmatic agenda. This may be the most opportune moment, as Türkiye is preoccupied with pressing domestic challenges that require greater attention than supporting an increasingly irrelevant proxy group.
Practical steps such as facilitating refugee returns, coordinating security measures, and expanding trade can serve as building blocks for gradual diplomacy and the incremental improvement of bilateral ties between Türkiye and Syria. Within this framework, the Brotherhood has moved from being a central actor to becoming a test of Türkiye’s readiness to adapt and recalibrate relations with the wider Middle East on new terms.
The Syrian decision to dissolve the Brotherhood represents more than the removal of a particular ideological current. The movement had influenced conservative parties in Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and beyond, standing as one of the most organized expressions of political Islam in the Arab world. Its ability to endure, even in exile, gave it a significance that extended far beyond its geographical base.
Yet this model has been in sharp decline. The Egyptian Brotherhood was dissolved in 2013, while the Tunisian Ennahda shifted away from its religious identity in favor of a civic political platform. In Jordan, the movement splintered into smaller factions with limited political leverage. Syria now appears to be following this trajectory, closing what remained of its symbolic foothold.
The broader trend is clear: Faith-based politics in the region are increasingly moving away from the centrist Brotherhood paradigm. As reflected in the TRENDS Muslim Brotherhood International Power Index, the movement’s influence has been steadily eroding across key regional arenas.
Political Islam does not vanish as a result. Rather, it adapts. In Egypt, for instance, it has re-emerged in more subdued forms of social and religious activism after the Brotherhood’s dissolution, while in countries like Sudan it has been absorbed into authoritarian–Islamist hybrids. Yet the idea of the Brotherhood as the principal voice in Islamic politics has largely faded. Its potential dissolution in Syria marks not only the eclipse of a period in which the Brotherhood aspired to embody the future of political Islam, but also the closing of a significant chapter in opposition politics.
4 min read
