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Türkiye’s criminal procedure framework grew from continental European models, particularly of Swiss and Italian structures at the beginning of the republic, rather than the U.S. approach. As a result, the country has never adopted a commercial bail system like that of the United States, where defendants can pay set amounts to await trial outside custody.
Turkish law technically allows a form of financial guarantee under Articles 109 and 113 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but this mechanism is rarely used.
For decades, the country operated on a strict binary of either pre-trial detention or release pending trial. Judges had limited tools in between, often facing an all-or-nothing choice.
A significant shift came in 2005, when Türkiye introduced a French-style judicial control mechanism. This reform enabled courts to impose conditions such as travel bans or periodic check-ins with police instead of ordering detention. The aim was to reduce unnecessary incarceration and bring Türkiye closer to European norms.
However, the option of trial while in custody is still used quite frequently. For example, in 2023, Izmir’s 1st Magistrate Court recorded 1,068 detentions, 1,196 judicial control decisions, and 253 outright releases, meaning nearly half of all suspects were placed under judicial control. Similar ratios appear in major cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Bursa, and Antalya.
These figures suggest broad use of judicial control. Yet they coexist with another trend pointing in the opposite direction.
Despite widespread judicial control orders, Türkiye continues to detain a strikingly high number of individuals before trial.
The country’s pre-trial detention rate per 100,000 people stands at roughly 100—far above France (39), the United Kingdom (29), Germany (19), and the Netherlands (19). While the Turkish rate has declined slightly since the early 2010s, it still exceeds European averages by a wide margin.
This contradiction generates a familiar public frustration. News reports often highlight individuals described as having “multiple criminal records,” raising questions about why so many people with past incidents remain free while pre-trial detention rates remain high.
Part of the confusion stems from the terminology. In public discourse, “criminal record” is often conflated with “judicial record.” In Türkiye, the latter refers strictly to finalized convictions.
The former, routinely cited in media, includes a wide range of police database entries: detentions, investigations, complaints, dismissed cases, acquittals, suspended verdicts, and even intelligence notes.
Someone with “30 records” may never have been convicted of anything. Many ordinary citizens accumulate such entries due to frequent complaints, politically motivated filings, or minor administrative incidents. This makes raw record numbers an unreliable indicator of criminality.
Still, past incidents can be relevant. Repeat offenses in certain categories, such as violent conduct or dangerous driving, may trigger legitimate concerns. But other entries often involve low-level or expression-related offenses, which complicates blanket assumptions about risk.
Like many European countries, Türkiye faces the challenge of balancing public safety with fair trial standards. Judicial control and supervised release systems occasionally fail to prevent serious crimes committed by individuals awaiting trial. High-profile cases attract significant attention and can shape public perception far more than statistical reality.
Comparable jurisdictions offer limited guidance. A notable study made in the U.S. found that fewer than 1% of defendants released under judicial control committed new offenses while awaiting trial. When it comes to Türkiye, however, no comprehensive dataset exists.
The visibility of exceptions often overshadows the broader picture. Serious offenses committed by defendants under supervision generate widespread coverage and provoke criticism of perceived leniency.
Yet a more restrictive model carries its own risks. Expanding pre-trial detention without distinction, especially in politically sensitive or expressive offense categories, can heighten concerns about overreach, due process, and proportionality.
Any shift toward more automatic detention would likely increase the number of individuals jailed for speech-related charges or minor offenses. In countries where wrongful convictions already pose challenges, this risk becomes even more acute.
Beyond statistics, Türkiye faces systemic issues surrounding the duration and justification of detention decisions. A solution seems to be that without clear, individualized reasoning, courts shouldn’t resort to the argument that judicial control measures are “insufficient.”
Under Turkish law, pre-trial detention requires specific, evidence-based findings: a concrete risk of flight, or a plausible threat that the suspect may tamper with evidence or interfere with the investigation. These conditions must be articulated for each case. Yet in practice, reasoning is frequently generic, citing broad categories rather than personalized assessments.
Lengthy pre-trial detentions compound the issue. Extended custody periods, sometimes lasting months or years, reflect structural delays in investigations and trials. Critics argue that without consistent application of strict legal criteria, pre-trial detention risks functioning as a form of punishment before conviction, which is a constant point that the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) warns Türkiye about.
A recent case in which a COVID-19 pandemic-era measure led to the release of 50,000 due to lengthy pre-trials also points to the same reality.
The combination of high detention rates, inconsistent application of judicial control, and inadequate justification seems to be a challenge within Türkiye’s justice system. The legal framework mirrors European models, but implementation often diverges, producing outcomes that place Türkiye at the top of the continent in the use of pretrial detention.
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