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Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan, in a rather unexpected manner, paid a visit to Moscow, reportedly at his own request, on April 1. During this visit, the Armenian leader was accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan and Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan.
Arguably, the visit was dictated by the pre-election logic: Pashinyan, routinely accused by the opposition of disregarding or even sabotaging relations with Russia, had publicly emphasized that “he is not afraid” of travelling there and meeting Russian President Putin one-on-one.
However, the visit stirred debates primarily due to the unusually outspoken and sincere character of the public part of the Pashinyan-Putin conversation, which basically turned into an exchange of position statements instead of an exercise in diplomatic niceties and doublespeak, such meetings usually tend to be.
Later on, the points of rupture that stood out during the short televised dialogue were elaborated by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk in his comprehensive interview with the State Information Agency (TASS). The scope of the Kremlin’s accumulated frustration with Yerevan’s increasingly bold foreign policy stance became fully clear. At the same time, these statements can be interpreted as ground testing for the fateful parliamentary elections due early June, which are set to define Armenia’s political course at least for the medium term.
During this televised dialogue, Putin directly raisedthe issue of Armenia’s European integration ambitions, emphasizingthat EU accession is fundamentally incompatible with membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Pashinyan countered by maintaining that if a definitive choice becomes necessary, the decision ultimately rests with the Armenian people.
For Armenia, the EU issue is quite a divisive one: while Pashinyan’s government has consistently pursued a course toward foreign policy diversification and gradual alignment with Western institutions, Russia remains its most significant economic partner.
Bilateral trade had skyrocketed since the imposition of heavy Western sanctions against Moscow, and surpassed $12 billion in 2024, mostly as Armenia became one of the key hubs for sanction evasion and re-export of European goods.
Against this backdrop, Armenia's robust GDP growth in recent years has served as a critical buffer, partially offsetting the government's reputational decline following its setbacks against Azerbaijan. Russia is well aware that the economic shock from an abrupt rupture of dense ties between Yerevan and Moscow would be severe, potentially destabilizing Armenia's domestic political balance—a reality that both Putin and Overchuk have openly signaled.
The latter even claimed, probably mocking Pashinyan’s “Real Armenia” concept, that “in the real world, Armenian businesses are gaining mostly from the Eurasian market,” and any attempts to replace it with the European one would be ill-founded and vain.
He also reminded that Armenia’s EU membership would mean the cessation of direct air connectivity between Armenia and Russia, due to the existing sanction measures. This, in turn, would have severe consequences beyond mere economic harm: most Armenians have relatives, friends or business partners living in Russia, turning this issue into a very sensitive one.
Moscow’s economic significance for Armenia isn’t limited to its multi-billion trade turnover and the common market, though. During the 20 years of the so-called “Karabakh clan” rule, Russia had acquired strategic assets within Armenia via local branches of its state companies, most significantly, electricity production and railway operations.
While Moscow considered these assets a guarantee of its long-term interests in the country, Pashinyan’s government views them as too big a vulnerability for an Armenia that intends to have a more independent foreign policy.
The Armenian Constitutional Court recently upheld the full nationalization of the Armenian Electric Grid. The company was owned by Samvel Karapetyan, a Russian oligarch of Armenian descent who, after returning to Armenia, established the opposition party Strong Armenia. Given Karapetyan’s reputation as a Russian proxy, the nationalization decision acquired very clear political undertones.
Contesting Russian ownership of Armenia’s railways would carry far deeper consequences, a prospect that has gained traction as the peace process with Azerbaijan evolves. Central to this issue are Yerevan’s plans to restore communication with its long-time enemy, specifically the reconstruction of long-defunct segments of the railway grid that have sat idle for decades.
Yerevan initially sent a formal inquiryto Moscow regarding its willingness to undertake the reconstruction works. However, following a positive reply, the Armenian government pivoted, arguing that continued Russian control of the railways could undermine plans to transform Armenia into a logistical hub and drive suppliers toward alternative routes. Consequently, Yerevan suggested that Moscow consider selling its railway assets to a “friendly country” with relevant expertise, such as Kazakhstan or the UAE.
This proposal was poorly received in Moscow, where Russian experts largely view it as a pretext for Pashinyan to further erode Russian presence in the country. These suspicions in the Kremlin are only intensified by the ongoing debate surrounding the future of Armenia’s nuclear sector.
The existing Metsamor plant, serviced by the Russian atomic agency Rosatom, is in dire need of renovation. However, Yerevan is now considering switching to small modular reactors actively promoted by the United States.
The U.S.’ intention to enter Armenian nuclear energy production was confirmed during Vice President JD Vance's visit this February. In his interview, Overchuk expressed skepticism regarding American capacity and willingness to implement these plans, emphasizing that Rosatom already has the technological know-how and resources to do the same work much more quickly.
However, it was President Putin’s touching upon the issue of Karabakh that most succinctly summarized Moscow’s agenda regarding Pashinyan. The success of the Baku-Yerevan bilateral peace process following the 2024 withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers—and the fact that the agreement was initialed in Washington rather than Moscow—has fueled alarm in the Kremlin. Despite his past endorsements of normalization between the two rivals, Putin claimed this time that it was Pashinyan’s recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity that reactivated the conflict on the international stage.
As Armenian opposition parties base their campaigns on accusations of Pashinyan’s "treason" and "surrender" to Baku, Putin’s statements are aimed at sending a clear message: that the current government sacrificed Karabakh for the chance to decouple from Russia.
To leave no doubt, the Russian leader even openly “asked” his Armenian counterpart to ensure the participation of “Russia’s friends” in the upcoming elections, probably implying all three major opposition parties, but primarily Karapetyan, by far the most popular of them. Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs read this scheme quite unambiguously, issuing a statement expressing concern with the Kremlin’s raising of the Karabakh issue.
The public spectacle in the Kremlin signals an intensification of the long-accumulating tensions between Yerevan and Moscow. Russia now appears poised to take a more proactive stance in triggering leadership change within its former republic. This shift likely stems from growing unease over the protracted war in Ukraine and the volatile implications of the Iranian conflict—both of which threaten the U.S. presence in the South Caucasus. Such pressures may have prompted Putin to adopt more desperate measures to halt Armenia’s strategic effort to dismantle its dependence on Russia.
By exploiting the Karabakh trauma and resorting to the whole arsenal of thinly veiled economic threats, Moscow likely hopes to embolden aligned political forces in Armenia ahead of an election that carries generational significance for the nation’s future.
Pashinyan must have grasped the scale of change in Putin’s demeanor, resorting to incredibly bold, if not reckless, comparisons of Armenian freedoms to Russian blockages of the internet—in contrast to his traditionally careful and reserved tone vis-a-vis Putin.
At the same time, this policy further alienates Baku, whose relations with Moscow have already strongly deteriorated since late 2024. In the case of Pashinyan’s party winning in the June 7 elections, the normalization process will likely pass the point of no return.
The article was first published by the Topchubashov Center.
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