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Central Asia has become one of the regions most severely affected by climate change in recent years.
The intensification of drought cycles, the collapse of water infrastructure and uncontrolled consumption are pushing the region's water resources into a critical state of vulnerability in terms of both economic sustainability and political stability.
World Bank data reveals that over 37 million people currently live in areas experiencing severe water stress, with this number potentially doubling by 2050.
Increasing pressure in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins is reshaping not only agricultural production but also the fundamental parameters of international relations.
The failure to establish a regional water management mechanism to replace centralised Soviet planning in the post-independence period further complicates the geopolitical context of the current crisis.
The water crisis in Central Asia has evolved into a multi-layered governance issue shaped by political-economic dynamics, extending beyond the region's natural conditions.
Following independence, the disintegration of the overarching institutional framework responsible for joint water management compelled countries to act in accordance with their own national interests. During this process, it was not possible to produce a consensus with binding force at the basin level, nor was it possible to establish a data-driven, long-term water allocation system.
Consequently, the failure to modernize the existing infrastructure, the inadequacy of water measurement stations, the uncertainty of water rights regimes and non-transparent decision-making mechanisms form the basis of today's crisis.
Irrigation channels and reservoirs inherited from the Soviet era were designed to serve a system geared toward intensive cotton production and therefore cannot adapt to modern agricultural needs.
Leakage from canals, evaporation and blockages have caused losses to rise to between 40% and 50%, demonstrating that the water deficit in the region is not merely a natural shortage, but rather the result of structural problems such as technical capacity, inadequate maintenance and poor planning. When uncontrolled water consumption aimed at increasing agricultural yields is added to this, sustainability across the basin is rapidly eroding.
The divergence of national priorities regarding water further exacerbates this fragility. For upstream riparian states such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, water is the cornerstone of energy security through hydroelectric power generation.
Releasing large quantities of water from dams to meet energy needs during the winter months directly affects the agricultural production cycle in the lower basin countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
As downstream countries view water as an indispensable input for the sustainability of strategic agricultural products such as cotton and wheat, the timing and quantity of water are closely linked to economic stability.
This conflict of interest not only weakens the basis for technocratic cooperation but also turns water into one of the most contentious issues in regional politics.
The release of water in exchange for energy, the use of power cuts as a means of exerting pressure on water policy, and even the designation of dam construction as a matter of national security by neighbouring countries are among the practical manifestations of this tension.
Another factor increasing vulnerability is the economic cost of the water crisis becoming increasingly apparent.
Agricultural yield losses, fluctuations in food prices, increasing rural poverty and accelerated labour migration are putting regional administrations under pressure both economically and socially.
The ecological degradation in Karakalpakstan provides a striking example of how a water crisis, combined with social fragility, can trigger political protests. In this regard, water ceases to be merely an economic issue and becomes a strategic element that directly affects internal stability and regime security.
At the regional level, the water-energy-agriculture cycle creates an interdependent relationship.
As upstream basin countries expand their energy production capacity, the agricultural cycle of the downstream basin becomes more sensitive. This asymmetric dependency reshapes the balance of power between countries and makes water one of the key parameters of regional geopolitical competition. The absence of binding institutional mechanisms to guide basin management, however, renders this dependency unmanageably fragile.
At this point, the water crisis is no longer a narrow problem that can be solved with technical investments; it has become a comprehensive strategic challenge requiring the combined efforts of institutional reform, economic transformation and regional confidence-building mechanisms.
Without understanding the political economy dimension of water in Central Asia, it seems impossible to establish a sustainable governance model or maintain stability at the basin level.
Large-scale hydroelectric projects in the water and energy sectors in Central Asia continue to be at the heart of the region's countries' long-term development and security strategies.
Although Kyrgyzstan's Kambarata-1 (hydroelectric power plant) project and Tajikistan's Rogun Dam are at different technical stages, both projects have the potential to shape the future of the water-energy balance.
Although Kambarata-1 is still under construction, it is gaining importance as an example of cooperation between Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
While the project's financing requirements, environmental impacts and technical questions regarding how water flow will be regulated remain relevant, the fact that a clear framework has not yet been established on these issues is causing the cooperation process to proceed cautiously.
The critical importance of water flow timing for downstream countries in particular necessitates that technical arrangements for the project proceed hand in hand with the diplomatic dimension.
Tajikistan's Rogun Dam represents the largest investment aimed at increasing energy capacity, and some of the dam's units have been gradually brought into operation.
How Rogun will affect the flow regime on the Amu Darya in later stages remains an important topic in water management discussions in the region.
Uzbekistan's previously cautious stance toward the project has not entirely disappeared despite the improvement in bilateral relations in recent years; however, Tashkent's recent pursuit of a more constructive dialogue opens a new window of opportunity for developing a regional understanding on water and energy issues.
The involvement of international organizations in Rogun's technical assessments also indicates that the project is being considered within a broader framework in terms of safety, sustainability and environmental impacts.
Both Kambarata-1 and Rogun share the common feature that water is not merely a resource, but lies at the heart of regional dependencies, economic models and strategic calculations.
The potential impacts of these projects could support cooperation by strengthening trust between countries, but could also create new uncertainties in the water-energy balance if the necessary technical and diplomatic coordination is not achieved.
The sensitivity of water flow to climatic conditions, hydrological variability and the inability to fully predict the long-term effects of infrastructure investments make these projects strategic initiatives that require careful management.
Therefore, although large hydroelectric projects have the potential to create areas for future cooperation in the region, concrete results appear to depend on establishing a more institutionalised framework for water management, transparently sharing technical data, and strengthening mutual trust between upstream and downstream basin countries.
The sustainable management of water resources can only be achieved through a new water governance architecture that recognises the reality of regional dependencies, is based on shared responsibility, and possesses enforcement power.
Otherwise, the current fragility, combined with climate change and demographic pressures, has the potential to drag Central Asia into a prolonged cycle of instability.
About the author: Zeynep Gizem Ozpinar is a board member and foreign policy specialist at the Turkish Foreign Policy Research Center (TUDPAM).
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