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Afghanistan has historically been described as the “heart of Asia”; it has been located at the crossroads of trade routes between East, West and South.
Today, the same geopolitical position is placing it back at the centre of regional power balances.
Uzbekistan, a landlocked Central Asian country, has made access to seaports a strategic priority in order to ensure sustainable economic development and diversify its foreign trade.
In this context, the Trans-Afghan Railway project stands out as more than just an economic initiative; it is a move to establish a new geopolitical axis in the power struggle in Eurasia.
For the Tashkent administration, the project offers an opportunity to overcome geographical constraints and integrate directly into global trade networks; for Afghanistan, it has the potential to both strengthen its status as a regional transit country and gain economic legitimacy.
Pakistan, meanwhile, aims to become the southern gateway to Central Asia via this route, planning to transform the ports of Gwadar and Karachi into the hubs of regional supply chains. However, factors such as security threats and technical standard differences cast uncertainty over the project's sustainability.
As a landlocked country, Uzbekistan has developed various foreign policy and infrastructure strategies since gaining independence in 1991 to mitigate the restrictive effects of regional isolation on economic growth.
At the heart of these efforts lies the desire to overcome the country's historically imposed “landlocked” status. The Trans-Afghan Railway project, in this context, is not only a transport project but also an initiative aimed at redefining Uzbekistan's geo-economic identity.
The project, proposed by the Tashkent administration in 2018, will start from Termez and extend from north to south Afghanistan, following the route of Mazar-i-Sharif, Logar and Harlaci, reaching the ports of Gwadar and Karachi in Pakistan.
With the completion of the approximately 850-kilometre (528.1 miles) line, the aim is for Uzbekistan to gain direct access to seaports. This access will both reduce transit times from 35 days to three to five days and significantly increase the country's export capacity by reducing transportation costs by 40%.
Therefore, the Trans-Afghan Railway is the cornerstone of Uzbekistan's goal of becoming a “regional hub country”.
The project is also a manifestation of Tashkent's “balanced and multi-faceted outward-looking strategy” in foreign policy.
While continuing its cooperation with initiatives such as the Eurasian Economic Union and the North-South Transport Corridor led by Russia, Uzbekistan is also striving to create an independent alternative between China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Trans-Caspian Corridor supported by the West.
In this way, the country aims to establish its own centre of gravity in the logistics backbone of Eurasia, going beyond developing an economic model based on transit revenues.
Another strategic dimension of the Trans-Afghan Railway for Uzbekistan is that it positions the country as a geopolitical crossroads on Central Asia's north-south axis. Until now, the Tashkent administration has conducted the majority of its trade via the northern route, namely through Russia and Kazakhstan.
However, Russia's exposure to heavy sanctions due to the Ukraine War has made the reliability of this route questionable.
Under these circumstances, the Trans-Afghan route serves as a geopolitical insurance policy for Uzbekistan, as it provides the country with direct access to both the Indian, Pakistani and Gulf markets and to maritime trade via South Asia.
Russia's interest in the project is multifaceted. Moscow aims not only to view the Trans-Afghan route as a trade corridor but also to turn it into a strategic tool for maintaining its influence in Eurasia.
Having lost a significant portion of its European markets due to the war in Ukraine, Russia sees land routes opening up towards Central and South Asia as alternative trade channels that will mitigate the economic impact of sanctions.
On the other hand, Russia's insistence that the line be built to its own standard of 1520 mm gauge transforms the project from a technical infrastructure issue into a geopolitical choice.
Indeed, Afghanistan's construction of a line compliant with Russian standards would complicate the integration of the line into Chinese or Western-linked corridors; consequently, it would provide Moscow with the advantage of preserving its regional sphere of influence.
This situation would elevate the future of the Trans-Afghan line beyond its economic dimension, transforming it into an extension of geopolitical competition.
Within the current framework, Uzbekistan is compelled to maintain Russia's technical and financial support while simultaneously striving to balance its pursuit of cooperation with China, Pakistan, and Western investors.
The project's sustainability hinges precisely on its ability to maintain this equilibrium.
Therefore, the Trans-Afghan Railway has become more than just a “transport corridor” for Uzbekistan; it has become a symbol of the country's determination to position itself as an independent actor in a multipolar world order.
The most fragile aspect of the Trans-Afghan Railway project is the security environment in Afghanistan and the issue of the international legitimacy of the Taliban government.
With the Taliban's return to power in 2021, Afghanistan has been driven into diplomatic isolation within the international system; this situation has made it nearly impossible for the country to attract foreign capital and financial institutions to its major infrastructure projects.
The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) do not engage in official cooperation with Afghanistan due to the Taliban government's stance on governance principles and human rights. Consequently, securing the necessary financial mechanisms from external sources to implement a multi-billion-dollar investment such as the Trans-Afghan Railway is extremely difficult.
From a security perspective, the proposed route passes through some of Afghanistan's most unstable regions. The line starts at Termez on the Uzbekistan border and extends through Mazar-i-Sharif, Logar, and Harlaci to Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.
However, these areas have seen an increase in attacks by organizations such as the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in recent years.
Daesh-Khorasan accuses the Taliban administration of “collaborating with non-Muslims” and carries out terrorist attacks targeting both the Afghan administration and foreign investors.
Meanwhile, attacks carried out by the TTP on the Pakistani border directly threaten not only border security but also infrastructure projects. Hundreds of security personnel lost their lives in attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in 2024, escalating tensions between Islamabad and Kabul.
Pakistan accuses the Taliban regime of harbouring militant groups operating on its territory, while the Taliban denies these allegations but is unable to fully control cross-border militant movements.
This mutual distrust frequently leads to border clashes between the two countries and undermines the security coordination necessary for the construction of the Trans-Afghan corridor.
However, the Taliban administration is also using the project as a means of legitimacy. The interim government in Kabul sees the Trans-Afghan Railway as an opportunity to rejoin the international system and overcome economic isolation.
Taliban officials have stated that revenues generated from transit traffic will contribute to the Afghan economy and that they will therefore establish special units to ensure the security of the route.
However, the fact that actual control is fragmented among local tribes, warlords and regional groups undermines the feasibility of such security pledges. Ethnic divisions in northern Afghanistan (particularly conflicts of interest between Tajik, Uzbek and Pashtun groups) are also among the factors threatening the secure operation of the corridor.
From a technical perspective, the obstacles facing the project are at least as serious as the security dimension. While Uzbekistan has a 1,520 mm gauge rail system inherited from the Soviet era, Afghanistan has a mixed track gauge system that varies across different regions.
Pakistan, however, uses the 1,676 mm gauge inherited from the British era. This difference requires the wheel systems to be changed or the loads to be transferred to other trains when crossing the border. This leads to both time loss and additional costs, weakening the economic sustainability of the project.
The choice of rail gauge is not merely a technical engineering decision, but also a geopolitical orientation.
Afghanistan's adoption of a system compliant with Russian standards would place the country within Moscow's sphere of technical and economic influence, whereas moving closer to Western or Chinese standards would signal a different power axis.
In addition, the geographical conditions along the route also pose a serious engineering challenge. The Hindu Kush Mountains' elevation exceeding 3,500 metres, frequent avalanches and snowstorms may cause the line to remain closed for extended periods during the winter months.
Consequently, high-cost engineering solutions such as tunnel construction and bridge systems will be required, necessitating international technical support.
At the regional level, the Trans-Afghan Railway is also bringing about infrastructure-based competition among Central Asian countries.
Kazakhstan is investing $500 million in the Turgundi-Herat line to develop an alternative access route to the Indian Ocean via Afghanistan.
Turkmenistan, similarly, aims to increase its transit revenues by investing in the Turgundi land port.
This situation demonstrates that Central Asia is moving towards multiple routes rather than converging on a single route for access to the sea.
However, the common denominator of all these initiatives is linked to the stability and security of Afghanistan.
In short, the fate of the Trans-Afghan Railway project depends not only on engineering success but also on security stability in Afghanistan, the Taliban government's capacity to gain international legitimacy, political consensus among regional countries, and the securing of sustainable financing sources.
Otherwise, the project will remain nothing more than a tool shaped by the power struggles of major powers.
About the author: Zeynep Gizem Ozpinar is a board member and foreign policy specialist at the Turkish Foreign Policy Research Center (TUDPAM).
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