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Since the Gaza meeting organized by U.S. President Donald Trump with regional countries alongside the UNGA meetings in September, the international agenda has been focused on the ceasefire in Gaza. Attention has also turned to how post-war Gaza will be shaped, including the distribution of responsibilities, the establishment of an international mechanism, the future of Palestine and Hamas, the guarantors, and the international stabilization force responsible for implementing the Gaza deal.
In fact, these issues have been under discussion for the past two years. Following the events of Oct. 7, numerous scenarios were proposed, and significant initiatives were launched concerning the post-war future of Gaza. Since then, there were important changes as well: the destruction and human loss in Gaza have reached the level of “genocide,” there has been a change of administration in the United States, while Israel’s elimination of Iran-backed militias in the region and the regime change in Syria have altered the balance of power, leading regional actors to seek new partnerships or solidify the existing ones.
In the coming days, a draft resolution is expected to be submitted to the U.N. Security Council concerning the structure and mandate of an International Stabilization Force to be established in Gaza. This will not be the first resolution about Gaza after Oct. 7. With the initiative of the Biden Administration, and with the help of Qatari and Egyptian mediators, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2735 was adopted on June 10, 2024.
That resolution was quite similar to Trump’s 20-point plan. It envisaged a three-phase process:
Including this last provision about the return of the remains of deceased hostages as part of the first phase in Trump’s 20-point plan is highly unfortunate, since reaching these bodies would only be possible during a comprehensive reconstruction process. In the current deal, this clause seems to serve as a pretext for Israel to block the agreement.
The resolution stated that if the first phase exceeded six weeks, the ceasefire would continue until negotiations concluded, and that the United States, Egypt, and Qatar would facilitate the transition to the second phase. It emphasized that no demographic or territorial changes could be made in the Gaza Strip and underlined that the ultimate goal was a two-state solution.
Right after Oct. 7, many other scenarios and plans regarding post-war Gaza also emerged. In particular, experts close to both the American administration and Israel in the United States proposed several ideas. The most plausible among them was the one suggested by former U.S. officials—a U.S.-led international force mandated by the U.N., or a joint force composed of several countries, including U.S. and Israeli troops, operating in cooperation with Arab nations.
While many of these plans mainly focused on Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia as potential Arab countries to take on peacekeeping roles during a transitional period, these countries made it clear that unless hostilities cease, Hamas is removed as a military actor, and a clear path toward a Palestinian state is established, they would not take part in any policing or stabilization efforts, as they do not wish to be perceived as new occupiers. This hasn’t changed, as currently, regional countries “hesitate to send troops to Gaza, fearing clashes with Hamas,” and recent reports only mention Egypt leading the stabilization force, with Türkiye, Indonesia, and Azerbaijan contributing troops to the 4,000-strong contingent.
Looking at Trump’s 20-point plan, we can see it combines elements from both the UNSC Resolution and earlier proposals. It highlights the temporary transitional governance of Gaza and the temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) to be immediately deployed in Gaza, both of which require a new UNSC mandate. According to the plan, the ISF is expected to work in coordination with Jordan and Egypt, and to cooperate with Israel and Egypt on border security, while the conditions and timing of the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) withdrawal would be determined jointly by the IDF, ISF, guarantor countries, and the U.S.
Neither the UNSC Resolution 2735 nor Trump’s 20-point plan mentions Türkiye. Despite not being named, Türkiye was represented at the presidential level both in New York and Sharm el-Sheikh, and since New York, it has participated at the foreign minister level in every coordination meeting of foreign ministers concerning Gaza.
While all reports emphasize the critical roles played by the intelligence chiefs and deputy chiefs of Türkiye and Egypt in both persuading Hamas to agree to negotiations and implementing the agreement, American officials—both publicly and privately—have consistently highlighted Türkiye’s role above all others. Although the document signed by the leaders of Egypt, Qatar, Türkiye, and the U.S. in Sharm el-Sheikh is merely a goodwill declaration without any legal status, its symbolic value is unquestionably significant.
We frequently see Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s statement, “If a two-state solution is accepted in Gaza, Türkiye is ready to act as a guarantor,” but Fidan had first made this proposal at the Cairo Peace Conference on Oct. 21, 2023. At the time, however, no one paid attention to it.
In July 2024, I wrote an article arguing that the U.S. should not exclude Türkiye when planning post-war Gaza, and many readers commented that “Israel would never allow Türkiye into Gaza.”
While it’s unclear whether Israel will accept Turkish soldiers on the ground, Türkiye has unquestionably become a leading actor in Gaza thanks to its mediation efforts with Hamas, but also to President Trump, who would like to lean on Türkiye in regional affairs. Türkiye is the same Türkiye: the only NATO country with the second-largest standing army in the region, achieving major successes in the defense sector, and has extensive peacekeeping experience. So, what has changed since 2023 that gives Türkiye a seat at the table?
The international conjuncture and the resulting shifting power balances are key to this change of perception. The weakening of the Iran-aligned axis, the regime change in Syria—in which Türkiye played its role—and Türkiye’s increasing influence and activity in the region are among the most significant developments.
Another major change is Türkiye’s strengthening policy of consultation and cooperation with regional countries since the end of the Qatar blockade in 2021—a policy that has proven successful over the past two years. This should be read for all parties involved as part of regional efforts to reduce dependence on the United States over the past decade.
Relations between Türkiye and Egypt, which had reached their lowest point when President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi came to power through a coup and overthrew the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Morsi, have taken a positive turn—even though both countries are still led by the same presidents. Today, Egypt is pressing the U.S. to include Türkiye in the ISF in Gaza as part of its conditions for its participation. During this period, Türkiye prioritized pragmatic cooperation with Arab countries over ideological politics—such as when extraditing an Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood member who had been granted asylum in Türkiye back to Egypt or when Türkiye supposedly asked Hamas leaders to leave the country after Oct. 7, for not being perceived as supporting terrorist activities.
Alongside its strategic partnership with Qatar since 2014, Türkiye has, over the last four years, not only elevated its economic and defense relations with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and other GCC states to unprecedented levels, but also consulted with them on nearly every regional political issue—often letting them take the spotlight while playing the most active role behind the scenes.
Another important change, of course, was the return of the Trump administration in the U.S. Although there has not been a radical shift in U.S. Middle East policy across the Trump–Biden–Trump administrations, and close cooperation between Türkiye and the U.S. has continued since 2022 on issues ranging from the Russia–Ukraine war to Iraq and the South Caucasus, what has changed is the “legitimacy” delivered by the U.S. to Türkiye as expressed by the U.S. Ambassador to Ankara and Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barack.
While the wording seems inappropriate, I believe by “legitimacy” Barack referred to “giving credit where it’s due”. Giving credit to Türkiye in the international arena that the previous Biden administration had denied, a denial which has direct repercussions on Türkiye’s perception in Europe and the West generally. During his four years, Joe Biden neither invited President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to the White House nor included Türkiye in major international summits, and he never publicly acknowledged any successful initiative achieved in cooperation with Türkiye.
No matter how pro-Israel Trump may be, he is the one who told Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in a press meeting at the White House, that he should be “reasonable regarding his demands from Türkiye.” Such gestures of recognition from Trump naturally influence other governments as well. And now it’s Israel’s turn to “give credit."
The Palestinian issue holds a special place in the hearts and minds of the Turkish people. Although Türkiye was the first Muslim-majority country to recognize Israel in 1949, the Palestinian cause has always enjoyed bipartisan support among both Turkish governments and the public.
This did not prevent Türkiye and Israel from developing strong economic and security partnerships in the 1990s. Close ties with Israel also strengthened Türkiye–U.S. relations, and Washington encouraged such cooperation, viewing Türkiye as a vital pillar of Middle East security.
Following the 2007 blockade imposed after Hamas took control of Gaza, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government adopted the Palestinian cause and has since provided continuous humanitarian assistance. Since Oct. 7, Türkiye has been the largest humanitarian donor to Gaza. And most recently, Turkish-flagged heavy machinery started cleaning the rubber and removing the debris due to the destruction caused by Israeli attacks.
After the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, Türkiye–Israel diplomatic relations hit rock bottom. The ruling party’s ideological affinity with Hamas and the long-term presence of Hamas leaders in Türkiye drew criticism in the West and Israel. Nevertheless, as a NATO member, Türkiye prioritized collective security over bilateral tensions. The decision to establish the NATO radar base in Kurecik—as one former senior U.S. official noted, “the core of the entire ballistic missile defense system against Iran”—was taken at a NATO Summit just six months after the Mavi Marmara crisis, during a period when diplomatic relations between the two countries had completely collapsed.
One should not forget that Türkiye is one of the main beneficiaries of the weakening of Iran’s resistance axis across the Middle East after Oct. 7. Türkiye remains among the most crucial countries balancing Iran in both the Middle East and the South Caucasus. While the country supports Iran’s weakening, it would object to the country’s being dragged into chaos.
The shifting dynamics of the Middle East since 2022 have brought Türkiye and Israel back together, and significant progress has been achieved in a short time. The same year, Turkish and Israeli security forces cooperated to prevent an Iranian plot to attack Israeli tourists in Türkiye. Despite exchanging harsh words for many years, as recently as September 2023, Erdogan and Netanyahu, met in New York as a culmination of normalization efforts between the two countries. At that time, Türkiye, after being left out of all regional cooperation initiatives, was trying to develop stronger ties with all regional countries, while Israel, strengthened by the Abraham Accords, was at the peak of its relations with Arab states.
Today’s picture is quite different: Israel finds itself increasingly isolated internationally. The recent Israeli attack on Hamas leaders in Qatar, ignoring the country’s national security, was troublesome for regional players. As the U.S. gradually withdraws from the region, it seeks to leave behind a Middle East where its allies are reconciled, and Israel’s security is guaranteed. In this context, an Israel–Türkiye rapprochement is inevitable.
Just as relations were reestablished after the Mavi Marmara crisis through the mediation of then-U.S. President Barack Obama, they are now expected to normalize—initially indirectly under Trump’s administration mediation, and directly once Netanyahu leaves office. The deconfliction mechanism in Syria is a good proof of this trend.
Türkiye, which has long served in U.N. and NATO peacekeeping missions and is far more respected by the people of Gaza than most Arab countries, is less likely to face concerns such as “Would Hamas attack Turkish troops?”
The deployment of Turkish soldiers in Gaza would not bring any material gain to Türkiye, but it would greatly contribute to regional stability and the security of the people, not only in Gaza but the whole region, to the Euro-Atlantic world as a whole. Israel is fully aware of this—otherwise, its media would not be filled these days with praise for Türkiye and its leadership despite Netanyahu’s and Israel’s public opinion’s objections to Turkish presence in Gaza. It’s time for Israel to “give credit” to Türkiye….
DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Türkiye Today.
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