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The Turkish Competition Board’s recent decision to impose interim measures on Google over its AI-powered search services raises an important question: How should competition authorities respond to emerging technologies that are transforming established markets?
The decision is significant not only for the relationship between Google and news publishers but also for the broader challenge of regulating artificial intelligence without undermining innovation and competition.
The board initiated an investigation into whether Google had leveraged its strong position in the general search services market to impose discriminatory or unfair trading conditions on news publishers, potentially infringing Article 6 of Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition, which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position.
The investigation concerns Google’s use of news publishers’ content in AI Overviews and AI Mode and the contractual conditions governing that use. Without awaiting the final outcome of the investigation, the board also imposed interim measures on Oct. 8, 2026, intended to prevent harm to competition that could prove difficult to remedy.
Accordingly, the decision does not constitute a definitive finding of an infringement but rather a preventive intervention based on serious concerns regarding a potential abuse of dominance and its consequences.
At the heart of this issue lies a changing economic relationship between organizations that produce news content and digital platforms that use this content to provide services to users. Under the traditional model, Google generated traffic for news websites, thereby contributing to their advertising revenues.
Under the emerging model, users may obtain the information they need directly from AI-generated responses displayed within Google’s search interface. As a result, publishers that bear the costs of producing original content may find themselves unable to generate sufficient traffic or advertising revenue, even when their content contributes to the information provided by AI services.
This transformation could have particularly significant long-term implications for news organizations that rely heavily on digital advertising revenues.
From a competition law perspective, however, the central issue is not simply the potential decline in website traffic. Such a decline may also reflect technological progress and changing consumer preferences.
Rather, the key question is whether Google, as a dominant undertaking in general search services, uses its market position to determine unilaterally the commercial terms governing its relationships with news publishers.
As many news organizations depend heavily on Google to reach their audiences, rejecting the terms offered by the platform may entail substantial economic costs. This dependence can create considerable asymmetries in bargaining power between the parties.
The Turkish Competition Board’s concerns focus precisely on these issues. The board questioned whether Google applies sufficiently objective and transparent criteria when selecting publishers, determining remuneration, and negotiating contractual terms. It also required mechanisms allowing publishers to refuse the use of their content in AI services without adversely affecting their visibility in Google’s other services.
Similar concerns have emerged internationally. In France, the competition authority imposed a €500 million fine on Google in 2021 for failing to comply with obligations concerning negotiations with news publishers.
In March 2024, it imposed an additional €250 million fine for breaches of binding commitments, including issues related to the use of publishers’ content in Google’s AI service, Bard.
In the United Kingdom, the Competition and Markets Authority introduced conduct requirements in June 2026 aimed at strengthening publishers’ control over the use of their content in AI-powered search services. South Africa’s Competition Commission has also examined the effects of digital platforms on news publishers and adopted measures intended to address concerns about bargaining power and the sustainability of news production.
Meanwhile, the European Commission opened a formal antitrust investigation in December 2025 into Google’s use of online content for artificial intelligence purposes.
The investigation examines whether publishers receive appropriate remuneration and whether they can effectively refuse the use of their content. It also considers whether Google’s access to YouTube content provides an advantage over competing AI developers.
These developments indicate growing regulatory attention to the relationship between dominant digital platforms and content producers. Yet they also raise questions about the appropriate scope of intervention.
Digital markets are characterized by economies of scale, network effects, data-related advantages, and substantial barriers to entry. These characteristics may reinforce the positions of established platforms and make it difficult for new competitors to enter. The integration of artificial intelligence into existing search services could further strengthen incumbent firms by allowing them to extend their established market advantages into emerging technologies.
Nevertheless, the economic justification for regulatory intervention should rest on evidence of harm to the competitive process rather than the commercial difficulties experienced by particular firms. Differences in contractual terms or remuneration, for example, are not necessarily anticompetitive.
They may reflect legitimate differences in content quality, audience reach, or economic value. What matters is whether these differences can be objectively justified and whether they distort competition.
There is also considerable uncertainty about how the economic value of content used in AI services should be measured. Publishers contribute information that may improve AI-generated responses, but identifying the value attributable to individual sources is difficult.
Greater transparency regarding content usage and user engagement could reduce information asymmetries and improve negotiations.
More importantly, excessive intervention in emerging AI markets could produce unintended consequences. Developing AI technologies requires substantial investment and involves considerable technological uncertainty.
Complex regulatory obligations may disproportionately burden smaller developers, potentially strengthening established platforms that are better equipped to absorb compliance costs. In such circumstances, regulation intended to promote competition could inadvertently increase market concentration.
From this perspective, the Turkish Competition Board’s approach is noteworthy. Rather than prohibiting AI-powered search or directly regulating remuneration, the interim measures emphasize transparency, objective criteria, non-discrimination, good-faith negotiations, and publishers’ ability to make independent choices.
Such obligations may address specific concerns arising from market power while preserving room for commercial negotiation and technological development.
The broader challenge is to distinguish between the legitimate consequences of technological change and the anticompetitive exercise of market power. Artificial intelligence may disrupt existing revenue models, but it also creates opportunities for greater efficiency, improved services, and new forms of competition.
Regulatory intervention should not prevent these benefits from materializing. Ultimately, competition law should protect the competitive process, not existing business models.
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