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Diplomacy has resumed, but the guns haven't slowed.
Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner shuttled between Moscow and Kyiv this month for talks with the Russian and Ukrainian leadership, yet there's still no formal settlement roadmap, and the core disputes over territory and security guarantees remain as wide as ever.
The harder question is whether the material balance is actually moving toward compromise. Both sides still have military options they can plausibly expect to improve their eventual terms.
Russia can seek further territorial gains and intensify strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure, while Ukraine can strengthen its defence and extend attacks into Russia’s rear.
A harder phase can therefore emerge without a decisive Russian breakthrough. The relevant test is whether Moscow can raise the cost of holding the front faster than Kyiv can absorb it.
Around Kostiantynivka, Russian infantry infiltrationdescribes small groups using built-up areas to find weak points, infiltrate and accumulate inside the city.
Russian accounts from Kostiantynivkaalso describe small assault groups operating under heavy drone observation and the difficulty of moving across open ground.
The sources differ over the extent of territorial control. Their tactical descriptions nevertheless converge on a battlefield where infiltration and drone coverage can matter more than a clean line on a map.
Large troop concentrations under drone observationare increasingly difficult to employ. Russia can therefore raise pressure through many small local actions without recreating a 2022-style mechanized offensive.
Over time, gains that look minor on the map can force Ukraine to move reserves more often and make supply routes harder to protect.
AroundSloviansk and Kramatorsk, further Russian advances would put pressure on two of the main Ukrainian-held cities in northern Donetsk. Fighting around Huliaipolein eastern Zaporizhzhia keeps another southern sector active at the same time.
Ukraine can answer deeper in Russia’s rear. On Sept. 9, the Novorossiysk naval base strike andthe Krasnodar Krai raidconfirmed a mass raid on Krasnodar Krai and damage to port infrastructure in Novorossiysk.
Russia’s own port authority states thatNovorossiysk handles crude oiland petroleum products and that a Russian Navy basing area lies next to the commercial port. Strikes there can therefore impose costs on military activity, logistics and energy exports at the same location.
Russia’s January-August federal budgetfigures show a cumulative deficit of 5.8 trillion rubles, or 2.5% of GDP, already above the 3.79 trillion rubles planned for the full year.
August itself was in surplus, and the Finance Ministry says part of the unusually rapid spending reflectsearly contracting and advance payments. TheBank of Russia’s September surveyputs 2026 GDP growth at 0.5%, while the 14% policy ratestood on Sept. 10.
The same fiscal picture also shows the scale of resources still directed toward defence. The 2026 federal budget allocates 12.93 trillion rubles to national defense, around 29 percent of total federal expenditure.
Oil and gas revenues fell 16.7% year on year to about 5 trillion rubles in January through August, while non-oil and gas revenues rose 18.1 percent to 20.9 trillion. India still importedabout 2.1 million barrels per day of Russian crudein August, according to Kpler data.
Russia is therefore operating in a tighter fiscal environment while still directing large resources to defence and selling substantial volumes of oil abroad.
The EU’s 21st sanctions packagewidened restrictions on Russian finance, the shadow fleet and parts of the oil sector. Such measures increase the cost and complexity of financing and trade over time.
Current defense allocations and oil flows still support substantial spending in the near term. Rising fiscal pressure could shorten Moscow’s preferred time horizon. If future costs are expected to rise, the incentive to seek additional battlefield gains sooner may also increase.
NATO says allies allocatedabout $10 billion to PURL and U.S. foreign military salesover the previous year, while PURL continues to deliver critical equipment including air defense. That support gives Kyiv more capacity to absorb pressure on the front and in the air.
Recent strike packages show that air pressure can rise independently of ground movement. The Sept. 9 Russian air attack involved 196 drones alongside ballistic and other missiles, with missile or drone impacts recorded at 23 locations.
Russian-side reporting on Sept. 9 described strikes on port infrastructure, warehouses and trains. Moscow can use such attacks to increase pressure on transport and infrastructure without waiting for a decisive ground breakthrough. Ukraine’s own deep strikes mean that any escalation would also impose costs inside Russia.
The clearest sign would be sustained Russian pressure on several ground axes at the same time, combined with a higher strike tempo against rail and energy infrastructure.
Repeated Ukrainian redeployment of reserves between threatened sectors would be more significant than a sudden change in map color.
If that pattern lasts for several weeks, the war could become materially harder for Ukraine even without a dramatic breakthrough.
If negotiations fail to narrow the territorial and security disputes, Moscow may calculate that additional battlefield pressure can improve its bargaining position before winter and before economic costs accumulate further.
Kyiv has equally strong reasons to deny that advantage through defence, deep strikes and continued external support.
The present talks can still produce useful limits on escalation. A durable settlement becomes harder to reach while both sides believe further fighting can improve the terms they eventually receive.
Under those conditions, the war has a credible path toward greater intensity before any sustained de-escalation becomes possible.
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