Newsletters
Last September, the Greek media celebrated the introduction of four amendments to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2026 in the U.S. These amendments aim to strengthen the alliance between Greece, Cyprus, and Israel and target Türkiye through the U.S. The American Hellenic Institute collaborated with pro-Greece-Israel congressmen to propose these amendments. All four amendments have received endorsements from the Hellenic American Leadership Council (HALC), the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), and the American Jewish Committee (AJC).
Furthermore, the American Hellenic Institute has advocated for members of Congress to cosponsor seven additional amendments to the NDAA. These amendments aim to ensure Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge against Türkiye, target Ankara’s activities in Syria and Iraq, address Turkish-Iranian relations, block F-35 sales to Türkiye, prohibit the sale or licensing of F-16 aircraft or their upgrade technology, and also target Azerbaijan.
In parallel with this, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis vowed in October that Greece would work to keep Türkiye from being able to participate in the European Union’s new Security Action for Europe (SAFE) plan. SAFE is a financial initiative that offers up to €150 billion ($175.83 billion) in loans to EU member states to enhance their defense preparedness. It allows for the participation of third countries, such as Türkiye, a NATO member with an expanding defense sector.
Greece has consistently aligned itself on what history has proven to be the wrong side of regional conflicts, pursuing a series of maximalist, confrontational alliances against Türkiye that have uniformly failed to achieve their strategic objectives. Rather than learning from these failures and adjusting to new regional realities, Athens has doubled down on its antagonistic approach; now betting heavily on Israel despite the latter's genocidal policies in Gaza and the unprecedented destabilizing and expansive regional behavior.
Greece's track record of failed anti-Türkiye coalitions is extensive and instructive. In Syria, Athens stood firmly behind Bashar al-Assad's brutal regime, viewing the Syrian dictator as a counterweight to Turkish influence. This support for a regime responsible for hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths not only placed Greece on the wrong side of history but also isolated it from the broader Arab world, which increasingly supported opposition forces. The eventual collapse of Assad's regime, and the emergence of the opposition to lead Syria as well as the new Syrian-Turkish alliance, demonstrated the futility of Greece's strategy.
In Libya, Greece threw its support behind General Khalifa Haftar of eastern Libya who launched a failed military coup against the internationally recognized government in Tripoli in 2019. Greece saw Haftar as a part of a broader regional alliance that aimed to isolate Ankara and challenge the Türkiye-Libya maritime delimitation agreement. However, Türkiye's decisive military intervention in support of the Tripoli government in 2020 turned the tide of the conflict, forcing Haftar into retreat and solidifying Türkiye's strategic position in Libya. Greece's bet on Haftar not only failed militarily but also left Athens diplomatically isolated, as even Haftar himself has since moved to repair relations with Ankara.
Perhaps most significantly, Greece attempted to construct a broad anti-Türkiye coalition by courting Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. In the period between 2017and 2021, these states were engaged in their own rivalry with Türkiye, particularly over issues related to regional influence. Greece sought to leverage this tension, forging defense and political agreements with these nations. However, this strategy fundamentally misread the regional trajectory. Following 2021, relations between the UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye normalized, and these nations recognized Ankara as an indispensable strategic partner rather than an adversary. The Gulf states' rapprochement with Türkiye was driven by pragmatic considerations, including defense cooperation, economic ties, and the need for regional stability. Greece's attempt to position itself as the Gulf's partner against Türkiye became obsolete almost as soon as it was formulated.
Greece also invested heavily in the EastMed pipeline project, a proposed 1,900-kilometer subsea gas conduit designed to transport natural gas from Israel and Cyprus to Europe via Greece, explicitly bypassing Türkiye but penetrating a maritime areas claimed by Ankara. The project was framed not just as an energy initiative but as a geopolitical tool to isolate Türkiye and challenge its maritime claims. However, the EastMed pipeline faced insurmountable technical, economic, and political obstacles and was destined to fail. In 2022, the United States withdrew its support for the project, effectively killing it. Moreover, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine increased the importance of Türkiye to the EU vis-a-vis this alliance. The pipeline's collapse underscored the impracticality of Greece's maximalist approach and its failure to account for the economic and diplomatic realities of the region.
Additionally, Greece sought to leverage France and the European Union as powerful allies against Türkiye. In 2021, Athens signed a landmark defense agreement with Paris, which included the purchase of French frigates and a mutual defense clause. Greece hoped that French military backing and EU diplomatic pressure would constrain Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, this strategy has yielded limited results. France's interests in the region are complex and often diverge from those of Greece. Additionally, the EU faces a paradox: it needs to collaborate with Türkiye, yet it is consistently abused by Greece into not working with Ankara. The France-Greece partnership, while symbolically significant, has not fundamentally altered the regional balance of power.
Now, after a decade of failed coalitions and strategic miscalculations, Greece has once again chosen provocation and confrontation over accommodation. Instead of finding common ground with Türkiye, dropping its maximalist territorial claims, and pursuing a policy of regional cooperation, Athens has placed its latest bet on Israel. This decision is particularly troubling because it highlights Greece’s moral bankruptcy and desperation as reflected by its support for a genocidal government, according to U.N. officials and institutions, among others, with over 60,000 Palestinians killed since October 2023.
By disregarding these atrocities and actively supporting Israel's regional ambitions, including the maintenance of its “Qualitative Military Edge”, Greece has once again positioned itself on the wrong side of history. This pattern of failed alliances questions the wisdom and sustainability of the Greece-Cyprus-Israel anti-Türkiye axis. This alliance faces fundamental structural problems, contradictory strategic interests, and adverse regional dynamics that render its long-term viability unattainable.
First, the Gaza war that began in October 2023 has fundamentally altered Israel's international standing, creating a liability rather than an asset for its partners. Greece and Cyprus now find themselves allied with a state facing unprecedented global condemnation and isolation. In July 2025, Greece initially declined to join 22 other states condemning famine conditions in Gaza and failed to sign a joint statement of 26 Western countries demanding humanitarian aid access.
This mirrors Greece's previous pattern of backing losing causes, from Assad's Syria to Haftar's Libya. Greece and Cyprus would soon realize that aligning with a genocidal regime can’t buy them influence, neither in the public domain nor in the official corridors in the Middle East. If something, Israel would implicate both states in its highly expansive and destabilizing policies, which would bring them nothing but problems.
Second, while Greece, Cyprus, and Israel attempt to contain Turkish influence, Türkiye has systematically expanded its regional power across multiple domains, rendering the alliance's core strategic objective obsolete. Moreover, Türkiye's role in brokering the Gaza ceasefire in October 2025 transformed what was once considered a liability—its ties to Hamas—into a major geopolitical asset.
Türkiye's success in Gaza negotiations has yielded tangible benefits in U.S. relations. The U.S. now supports Ankara’s security goals in Syria and its vision for regional stability and prosperity. This rapprochement with Washington directly undermines the strategic logic of the Greece-Cyprus-Israel alliance, which partly relied on positioning itself as America's reliable regional partner against an allegedly problematic Türkiye.
Third, Türkiye's military capabilities far exceed those of the alliance members combined. At the 2025 International Defense Industry Fair, Türkiye unveiled the Tayfun 4 hypersonic ballistic missile capable of striking all of these countries in the case they dared to threaten Ankara. Türkiye's military victories in Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan, among others, demonstrate Türkiye's ability to project power and achieve strategic objectives, while Greece's chosen partners consistently fail.
Fourth, in the energy domain, the alliance's flagship energy projects—meant to provide economic substance to strategic cooperation—have systematically failed or stalled, undermining the partnership's practical value. Türkiye's existing pipeline infrastructure and geographic position provide inherent economic advantages that alliance energy projects cannot overcome. Any route bypassing Türkiye to reach European markets will inevitably be more expensive, longer, and technically challenging than routes through Turkish territory. This fact renders the entire Greece-Cyprus energy cooperation framework obsolete.
Lastly, Israel views the alliance instrumentally—as one option among many for achieving its security objectives. Greece and Cyprus, by contrast, have invested heavily in the alliance as a cornerstone of their regional strategy. This asymmetry means Israel can and will pivot away when more advantageous options emerge, leaving Greece and Cyprus strategically stranded.
2 min read
