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Iran’s nuclear surprise nears as existential pressure builds

A man holds an Iranian flag amid the debris of a destroyed building following airstrikes in central Tehran, Iran, March 4, 2026. (AFP Photo)
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A man holds an Iranian flag amid the debris of a destroyed building following airstrikes in central Tehran, Iran, March 4, 2026. (AFP Photo)
April 04, 2026 02:30 PM GMT+03:00

This article was originally written for Türkiye Today’s weekly newsletter, Saturday's Wrap-up, in its April 4, 2026, issue. Please make sure you subscribe to the newsletter by clicking here.

“We are punching them when they are down,” said Pentagon chief Hegseth in the first days of the Iran warrhetoric that may appeal to Trump’s UFC fan voter base but remains distant from reality. In fact, the Washington gave Iran enough time to recover from the 12-day war and prepare for what may eventually come: a U.S.-Israeli joint operation aimed at regime change. As days passed, Trump began referring to the killing of Iranian generals as “regime change,” while arguably, by the same loose definition, “regime-changing” the Pentagon itself through the recent purge of generals.

Since the 12-day war, Iranian officials have publicly toyed with the idea of hardliners bringing the issue of withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to the floor of parliament. Now, the chatter has moved to the shadows, as Iranian diplomats whisper these early warnings to the ears of friendly interlocutors, expecting them to understand the gravity of the nation’s situation.

Iran has increasingly branded IAEA officials as Israeli spies, flatly rejecting Director General Rafael Grossi’s request to visit nuclear facilities struck by Israel and the United States in June 2025. Viewing the nuclear agency as a mere proxy for U.S. and Israeli pressure, Iranian leadership remains convinced that Natanz and Fordow were hit based on the intelligence IAEA officials provided to Israel.

Technically, a hardline faction could introduce a draft proposal to Iran's 290-member parliament. Such a move would require an absolute majority before being sent to the constitutional court for approval. However, in the current geopolitical climate, this appears highly unlikely. As Serhan Afacan, head of the Center for Iran Studies (IRAM), notes: “This would lead to terrible pressure on Iran and would justify US-Israeli attacks in the eyes of the international community.”

There may, however, be another path forward. Gozde Toprak, an Iran researcher with a specific focus on Iran’s nuclear program, agrees that an official NPT withdrawal is unlikely. However, she detects a shift in the regime’s underlying calculus. “Iran now has a stronger will to acquire nuclear weapons. Regardless of whether their capacity has been diminished, the intent is there,” Toprak notes.

Rather than a sudden exit, Toprak envisions a model similar to North Korea’s: continuing to develop its nuclear capacity covertly, while maintaining formal commitments on paper. A formal NPT withdrawal would only occur once a certain level of technical capability, potentially including undisclosed testing, is achieved. This has long been a warning, the irony is that as the stakes get more existential for Tehran, its increased defensiveness may leave Israel, and the world, in the dark until it's too late. In such a scenario, Iran may feel its nuclear assets as its only guarantee of being untouchable. History witnessed how Ukraine was invaded nearly three decades after handing over its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances.

This shift in regional parity would almost certainly ignite a nuclear race across the Middle East. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has recently intensified his warnings about this risk in recent weeks. Saudi Arabia, another regional powerhouse, would likely pursue a similar path, viewing nuclear capability as a mandatory counterweight to Iran’s inventory.

Furthermore, the true danger lies in the speed of any such nuclear transition. While other nations spent decades mastering domestic enrichment, Riyadh’s immense financial reserves and its "special relationship" with Islamabad offer a unique shortcut, one that could bypass the traditional timeline for nuclear breakout.

Hence, a half-baked strike on Iran might trigger fallout that goes way beyond just a choked-off Strait of Hormuz or oil prices hitting the roof.

April 04, 2026 02:30 PM GMT+03:00
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