An October 2026 IMF working paper estimates that $21.4 trillion in gross international stablecoin transfers took place across 188 countries between 2018 and 2025. Three-quarters of stablecoin holdings were concentrated in emerging and developing economies.
The IMF finds that restrictions on capital outflows are followed by more stablecoin activity, not less. When governments restrict capital outflows, stablecoin activity increases by roughly 30% over the following six months. Following currency crises, stablecoin holdings rise by approximately 75% within a year.
It is not unusual for institutions like the IMF to be on the conservative side of technology when it comes to financial innovation. That said, the findings in the IMF paper are good news for regulators in Türkiye, which has had a broadly liberal foreign-exchange regime for almost 40 years.
However, Türkiye faces a different challenge; the focus should be on how businesses can adopt emerging payment technologies in a lawful, secure, and cost-effective manner.
In July 2025, the U.S. enacted the GENIUS Act. It created a federal regulatory framework for payment stablecoins that supports privately issued stablecoins backed by liquid reserves. Authorized issuers are expected to hold U.S. dollar cash, central bank deposits, or U.S. Treasury securities to meet redemption obligations.
The Trump Administration also explicitly banned the Fed from developing a digital dollar. Instead, it now supports private digital currencies that could reinforce the dollar’s position as an international reserve currency.
Stablecoins licensed in reputable jurisdictions do not require additional licensing in the U.S. This is a rare example of regulatory equivalence in the age of American exceptionalism.
As stablecoins circulate internationally, they can expand dollar use and create additional demand for American government debt.
Another IMF working paper, published in March 2026, examined how financial markets responded to the GENIUS Act.
Its authors estimate that the GENIUS Act reduced the expected market value of established American payment companies, like Mastercard, by approximately $300 billion, or 18%. For companies specializing in cross-border payments, the estimated impact was 27%.
Less intermediation is good news for emerging markets like Türkiye. International payments for emerging markets still involve too many intermediaries.
The tricky point for most emerging economies like Türkiye is balancing financial sovereignty with the spread of digital currencies.
Türkiye accounts for roughly 1% of the world economy. It is hard for Türkiye to build an alternative global monetary order. But it can protect the domestic payment systems and benefit from international innovation.
From this perspective, TROY, Türkiye's domestic card payment scheme, is a good example. It cannot replace every international financial connection, but it offers a useful safeguard. For instance, it allows domestic transactions to continue if international card networks become unavailable.
However, Türkiye's regulatory framework does not yet embrace stablecoins. It already permits certain export proceeds or money transfers to be settled through informal, non-bank channels for over 50 countries. Arrangements such as hawala can be used under specified conditions. Yet, a broad ban on crypto payments, introduced several years ago, still makes stablecoin settlement of export payments impossible.
Why should an old informal transfer method be acceptable while a digital alternative is not?
I am not arguing that blockchain should receive special treatment. Nevertheless, similar financial activities should face consistent rules, regardless of the technology used.
Türkiye has spent years aligning its financial rules with standards developed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). More recently, fintech companies have faced license cancellations and investigations over alleged misconduct and regulatory violations.
Supervision matters. As an emerging market well integrated into the international economy, Türkiye needs to keep fraudsters out of its financial system. But more rules do not necessarily make the system safer.
The October IMF study gives emerging markets like Türkiye a reason to be cautious. In countries imposing capital-outflow controls, stablecoin activity increased rather than disappeared.
Thus, restrictions can push transactions outside regulated institutions and allow alternative methods to emerge. When that happens, authorities may lose access to intelligence that would otherwise help them detect suspicious or criminal activity.
Türkiye has to decide how legitimate trade and remittance payments can use stablecoins under clear rules. Accordingly, stronger oversight is needed, not unnecessary obstacles for everyone.
The U.S. is already reshaping the global regulatory framework for stablecoins to serve its own interests. Ankara does not need to imitate Washington, but the steps it takes should not exclude Türkiye from the newly emerging financial networks either.