In the wake of the Israeli–U.S. attack on Iran, the conflict has quickly escalated into a full-blown regional war, just as Iran had long warned it could.
Across the Gulf, American military and civilian facilities, airports, hotels, critical infrastructure, and city centers have come under fire. In the first 13 days alone, Gulf air defenses intercepted over 783 missiles and 2,350 drones, underscoring the scale and intensity of the threat.
Currently under attack, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates are NATO partners through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), established in 2004, which provides initiatives to advance defense cooperation between GCC countries and NATO. Saudi Arabia, while not officially a partner, also cooperates closely with NATO and takes part in exercises.
The region’s importance is not new. NATO has recognized the southern neighborhood as strategically significant since the 1990s, particularly in counterterrorism. The area has never been stable, repeatedly producing crises that reverberated across the Euro-Atlantic space and sometimes demanded major NATO involvement: the Gulf War, the Iraq War, 9/11, interventions in Afghanistan and Libya, the fight against Daesh, and the war in Syria are all stark examples.
To address these challenges, NATO developed structured dialogue and cooperation with regional partners through the Mediterranean Dialogue (1994) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (2004).
These frameworks bring together Mediterranean and Gulf partners to tackle shared threats such as violent extremism, protection of energy infrastructure, missile defense, and cybersecurity.
The southern neighborhood’s strategic weight has surged even further after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. At the Madrid Summit, NATO declared Russia “the most significant and direct threat to Allied security." Russia’s presence in the Black Sea, Western Balkans, Syria, Libya, the Sahel, and Central Africa—through mercenaries, political manipulation, and disinformation—shows that security in the East and South is connected.
Since 2022, NATO has officially recognized the southern neighborhood not as a peripheral concern anymore but as a strategic security priority. While the eastern flank remains the main focus due to the war in Ukraine, it is now clear across the alliance that developments in the south directly influence security in the east and the Mediterranean—and affect energy security, terrorism, migration, naval stability, and global trade.
The region’s significance is further amplified by Europe’s growing reliance on oil and gas from MENA countries to reduce dependence on Russia. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept highlights the southern neighborhood as a rising source of instability, shaped by conflicts, terrorism, weak governance, climate risks, and Russia’s destabilizing role.
Concrete threats underline this urgency. Terrorism remains a major concern for Europe, North America, and the wider North Atlantic area, as groups like Al-Qaeda and Daesh continue to operate in the Levant, West Africa, and the Horn of Africa.
The situation in Gaza could spark new attacks, particularly in Western countries seen as backing Israel. Yemen’s conflict may spill over into the broader region. Libya remains fragile, with NATO members pursuing differing policies and often competing agendas. Due to the war in Iran, we may see an increase in terrorist activities in Iraq and Syria.
Maritime security is also critical. NATO members, including the U.S., U.K., France, Norway, and the Netherlands, have experienced attacks on commercial shipping and naval vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, mostly from Houthi missile and drone strikes or piracy.
The ongoing war with Iran, which has blocked commercial shipping and energy flows through the Hormuz Strait—the Gulf’s only link to the open ocean and a route for roughly one-fifth of global energy supplies—has placed serious strain on Gulf economies and global oil markets.
The vulnerabilities revealed by recent conflicts are undeniable. Wars in Ukraine and between Iran, Israel, and the U.S. show how exposed cities and critical infrastructure are to missile and drone attacks. In the current war between Iran and the U.S.-Israel alliance, NATO air defenses intercepted three ballistic missiles in Turkish airspace, highlighting the pressure on NATO’s southern flank. The region urgently needs strengthened air defense, which will likely require more NATO support and investment.
To respond to these threats, NATO has long engaged with partners through military education, training, and capacity-building to help them manage regional threats. Practical engagement activities range from security sector reform and capacity-building to interoperability, countering weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), counter-terrorism, maritime security, energy infrastructure protection, and civil preparedness. Mediterranean Dialogue and International Cooperation Initiative (ICI) partners also contribute to NATO-led missions and exercises.
In 2025, NATO intensified engagement with these partners under the Southern Neighborhood Action Plan, agreed upon at the 2024 Washington Summit.
Key areas for cooperation identified by NATO foreign ministers in April 2025 included regional security strategy, counter-terrorism, cyber defense, maritime security, countering information threats, scientific cooperation, and climate-related security risks. These priorities were discussed with all partners during a security dialogue in Naples in May 2025.
The reluctance of key regional players to fully engage in the ICI, the dominance of bilateral arrangements with Gulf states instead of a unified bloc-to-bloc approach, and ongoing divisions within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) over threat perceptions and competing security interests have prevented the ICI from achieving concrete results in the security sector.
While NATO can’t offer protection guarantees to Gulf countries, stronger NATO coordination between Gulf countries could strengthen regional security integration.
The conflict between Iran and the U.S.–Israel may force NATO to review the Southern Neighborhood Action Plan while encouraging regional countries to further engage with NATO. First, the Alliance should expand its network of partners in the Middle East.
In maritime security, NATO’s flagship initiative—Operation Sea Guardian, which monitors Mediterranean sea lanes, counters terrorism, smuggling, and illegal trafficking, and supports partners through capacity-building—could be scaled up.
Iranian missile and drone attacks, including previous strikes by Iran-aligned Houthis, have shown that integrated air defense is essential for regional partners. U.S. support, such as the Middle East Air Defense Alliance, helps with early-warning coordination, but Iran’s targeting of these radars early in the conflict demonstrates that these systems present a risk for hosting countries, as the sensor and radar data shared through the network serve mainly to defend Israel as well.
In Gulf countries, growing perceptions that they are paying the price for a war they did not start or support—combined with ignored pre-war warnings, lack of consultation, and insufficient U.S. protection—have deepened mistrust of Washington and prompted questions about the risks of over-reliance on U.S. security. With the possibility of reduced U.S. investment in the region after the conflict, NATO-coordinated integrated air defense emerges as a viable alternative.
Another useful step would be for NATO to establish a multinational division on the southern flank, ready to respond to regional crises. Mediterranean members Türkiye, France, and Italy could lead this effort, given their complementary influence in the region.
These countries could collaborate within NATO to shape the agenda, but only if they adopt a multilateral rather than bilateral approach, reconcile competing interests in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean, and harmonize defense priorities.
Looking ahead, NATO’s southern neighborhood, already rising in importance, will become an even more urgent agenda item in light of the Iran conflict. The 2026 NATO Summit, to be held on 7–8 July in Ankara, offers an ideal moment to advance cooperation in the southern neighborhood, including expanding the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and its activities.