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Heraclitus once said, “Opposition brings concord. Out of discord comes the fairest harmony.”
Five years ago, the idea that Türkiye, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt would hold a joint summit, let alone prompt serious discussions about a defensive alliance, would have been dismissed as a geopolitical fantasy.
Yet this quartet, shaped in large part by the momentum generated by the Iran war, has engaged in frequent consultations. Just last week, it convened for the third time at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in Türkiye. While the West hasn't paid much attention yet, the meeting has already sparked a wave of coverage across Middle Eastern media.
The main question is whether a new military alliance is taking shape in the post-Iran war Middle East. However, most assessments suggest that a NATO-style pact or formal mutual defense treaty is unlikely. The reality is that these four countries have very different ideas of what constitutes a threat, and they each have other complicated international relationships to balance.
A strong defense relationship and mutual commitments among these countries do not necessarily require a formal alliance. In the post-American security environment, marked by a shift from a unipolar to a multipolar order, middle powers are diversifying their options and alliances to secure strategic autonomy. They hedge between seemingly competing partnerships.
While managing relationships within a network of overlapping groupings formed around shared interests, they maintain independent foreign policies alongside existing alliances. This emerging configuration is driven by setting aside past ideological differences, prioritizing strategic opportunities, and a shared stance against current conflicts and potential future regional threats.
Having learned from the regional isolation it experienced before 2021, Türkiye has since shifted toward normalizing and deepening ties with its neighbors. It has leaned heavily into mediation, a classic leverage tool for middle powers, while finding a balance between soft and hard power. While expanding defense industry cooperation across a wide geography, Türkiye has also intervened militarily when its interests required it, supporting friendly states and groups in places such as Syria, Libya and the South Caucasus.
This approach is not unique to Türkiye. Over the past decade, as the United States has signaled both rhetorically and in practice that it is stepping back from its role as the global policeman and arbiter, middle powers have stepped up to fill the vacuum, gaining more influence on the global stage.
Mediation has become the common thread pulling these countries closer together. The regional upheaval has been triggered by a series of shifts: the Oct. 7 Hamas attacks, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, wars involving Iran and the U.S.–Israel axis, Israel’s expansionist policies in Gaza, the West Bank, Syria and Lebanon. With the decline of Iran and its "Axis of Resistance," the old order is gone. In this new reality, these countries are looking for fresh leverage and new power blocs to keep the regional balance from tipping too far in any one direction.
Regional states are increasingly advocating for regional ownership, seeking to play an active role in conflict resolution and in shaping their own destinies. The Iran war accelerated the already ongoing bilateral and trilateral consultation and cooperation among these four countries.
Saudi Arabia and Türkiye were instrumental in bridging the gap between Syria’s new administration and the United States. When President Trump held his first meeting with Syria's new leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, the two were joined by Saudi officials on a phone call with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Since the regime change in Syria, Riyadh and Ankara have moved beyond just defense and economic deals, using constant diplomatic coordination to shape the new regional landscape.
Türkiye has also acted as a mediator in helping Gulf countries develop relations with Syria’s new leadership. In subsequent regional crises, Türkiye has consistently coordinated with its regional partners. The ceasefire process in Gaza, in turn, intensified Türkiye’s mediation and consultation efforts with Egypt.
A major turning point in regional threat perceptions came in September 2025, when Qatar, an indirect mediator between Hamas and Israel, was struck by Israel during ceasefire negotiations. With the 2019 strike on Saudi oil facilities and the attack on Qatar, regional countries had already begun to realize both their vulnerability and the limits of relying on the United States.
During the subsequent Iran war, Gulf countries experienced intense attacks from Iran and saw that their strategic partnerships with Washington neither protected them nor reduced their vulnerability. They also came to understand that frameworks such as the Abraham Accords or defense initiatives like the Middle East Air Defense Alliance were designed more to protect Israel than themselves.
Despite differing perceptions of the threat posed by Israel, these countries have concluded that strengthening regional cooperation is the best way to avoid becoming part of a post-war Middle Eastern order dominated by either Iran or Israel in the wake of a U.S. withdrawal. The war has also begun to shape post-war alignments.
Pakistan, having emerged as the stronger side in its latest round of conflict with India, is drawing closer to Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, countries with which it already maintains strong defense ties. Israel, for its part, has articulated a vision of a “hegaxon bloc,” a “comprehensive system of alliances,” likely referring to a bloc including India, the UAE, Greece, Southern Cyprus and Somaliland facing what Benjamin Netanyahu has defined as “radical axes” of Shiite and Sunni Islam, likely referring to the quartet.
Their bilateral relationships further reinforce cooperation among Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt and Pakistan. In 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a comprehensive defense agreement following Israel’s attack on Qatar. Recently, Pakistan deployed an air force contingent to King Abdulaziz Air Base to support Saudi defense. Türkiye and Pakistan maintain a close strategic defense cooperation, with Türkiye assisting in modernizing Pakistan’s navy and air force through submarine upgrades, corvette construction, and enhancements to F-16 aircraft. Türkiye also supported Pakistan during its 2025 conflict with India by blocking helicopter transit through Turkish airspace.
Between Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, growing trade and defense industrial cooperation—including joint production of Turkish Akinci UAVs in Saudi Arabia—stand out, alongside increasing foreign policy alignment in Syria, Libya, Sudan, Yemen and Somalia.
Egypt and Türkiye, following their normalization process since 2021, have expanded trade, cooperated on mediation initiatives, especially regarding Gaza, and during Erdogan’s visit to Cairo in February, the two countries signed a bilateral defense pact while expanding defense industry cooperation.
Cairo backed Riyadh’s 2015 campaign against the Houthis, and both countries continue to strengthen their defense ties. Additionally, Egypt relies heavily on financial support from Saudi Arabia, which has invested tens of billions of dollars to stabilize Cairo’s economy.
Saudi Arabia, leveraging its deep ties with both Cairo and Islamabad, serves as the vital link between these capitals. These various bilateral partnerships are now being woven together into a single four-party framework—a regional coordination umbrella that aligns their political strategies.
While this web of bilateral partnerships is not formally consolidated under a single multilateral umbrella, the cooperation has already produced results. Pakistan, in coordination with Türkiye and Egypt, contributed to shaping the extended ceasefire between Iran and the U.S.–Israel axis.
After their second meeting in Islamabad, these four countries emergedas a primary channel for negotiations that are set to shape the future of the Middle East. According to a statement by Egypt’s foreign minister on April 18, 2026, they are currently hammering out a security deal designed to end the current conflict and prevent it from breaking out again.
This quartet brings substantial capabilities to the table. Türkiye and Saudi Arabia are both G20 members; Saudi Arabia, as the world’s largest oil producer and leading exporter, provides financial strength. Türkiye, with NATO’s second-largest standing army, contributes manpower, a robust defense industry, and operational experience. Pakistan adds nuclear and missile capabilities, while Egypt’s strategic geography, controlling the Suez Canal at the junction of the Mediterranean and Red Seas, gives it critical leverage. Still, their gradual consolidation does not imply uniformity on all issues. The defining feature of this new era is flexible partnerships within a framework of strategic autonomy.
In recent months, the militaries of these four countries have been conducting joint exercises, both collectively and in bilateral formats. Interoperability among their armed forces is increasing, while trust and camaraderie continue to deepen.
Over the past year, these countries have expanded joint military exercises across multiple domains. Saudi Arabia joined Türkiye’s “Anatolian Phoenix” search-and-rescue drills, while Egypt and Türkiye conducted the naval exercise “Friendship Sea-2025.”
Türkiye and Pakistan took part in the Saudi-led “Spears of Victory” air exercise and held bilateral drills, including Atatürk-XIII and Jinnah-XIII. Egypt and Pakistan carried out the special forces exercise “Thunder 2” and all four participated in the Pakistan Army Team Spirit (PATS) 2026 competition—collectively strengthening interoperability and combat readiness.
While we may not see this quartet formalized under a single military alliance in the near future, their relationships could become more institutionalized. Bilateral ties may deepen further under the momentum of this framework, new partnerships may emerge, and the group could act as a core around which broader coalitions form on specific issues.
A recent example of such collective positioning came on April 23, when Jordan, Indonesia and Qatar joined this quartet in condemning Israel’s actions in Jerusalem and the occupied Palestinian territories—particularly at Al-Aqsa Mosque—as violations of international law and rejecting changes to the city’s status quo.
Ultimately, this emerging configuration signals a broader trend: in the coming period, cooperation among middle powers will likely be shaped by regionalization as a defining common denominator.
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